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Essays on International Trade, Welfare and Inequality
Zheli He
How important are the distributional e↵ects of international trade? This has been one of
the most central questions pursued by international economists, particularly because much
of the public opposition towards increased openness is due to the belief that welfare changes
are unevenly distributed. In this dissertation, I rely on counterfactual analysis and natural
experiments to study topics of international trade, welfare and inequality in the context of
both developing and developed economies. In particular, I combine theoretical modeling and
empirical analysis to examine the e↵ects of international trade on (1) real wages of individ-
uals within and across countries; (2) within-sector wage dispersion caused by heterogeneous
responses of firms with di↵erent productivity levels to cheaper imported inputs.
In each of the three chapters, I contribute to the existing literature by relaxing simplifying
assumptions that have proved to be inconsistent with data and exploring new mechanisms
that link international trade to inequality.
Chapter 1, “Trade and Real Wages with Demand and Productivity Heterogeneity,”
presents a general equilibrium model that incorporates the e↵ects of trade liberalization
on both an individual’s nominal wage and consumer price index. A vast majority of the
literature focuses on the income channel, which is its e↵ect on the distribution of nominal
wages across workers. A small number of studies consider the expenditure channel, which
is its di↵erential impact on consumer price indices. It is well known that the consumption
baskets of high-income and low-income consumers look very di↵erent. To our knowledge,
there are only three case studies that have looked at these two channels jointly for individual
countries, Argentina, Mexico and India. We provide a unified framework incorporating both
channels by allowing for non-homothetic preferences and worker heterogeneity across jobs.
In spite of its many dimensions of heterogeneity at the individual level, the model remains
tractable enough that allows us to estimate its key parameters and perform counterfactuals.
Chapter 2, “Trade and Real Wage Inequality: Cross-Country Evidence,” addresses the
following question: what is the impact of trade liberalization on the distribution of real
wages in a large cross-section of countries? Trade liberalization a↵ects real-wage inequality
through two channels: the distribution of nominal wages across workers and, if the rich
and the poor consume di↵erent bundles of goods, the distribution of price indices across
consumers. Prior work has focused mostly on one or the other of these channels, but no
paper has studied both jointly for a large set of countries. Based on the theoretical framework
in Chapter 1, I measure the distributional e↵ects of trade liberalization incorporating both
channels for a sample of 40 countries. More specifically, I parametrize the model using
sector-level trade and production data. Because skill-intensive goods are also high-income
elastic in the data, I find an intuitive, previously unexplored, and strong interaction between
the two channels. According to my counterfactual analysis, trade cost reductions generate
dramatically di↵erent results for both nominal wage inequality and price index inequality
than what previous research has obtained by focusing on either channel alone. I find that
trade cost reductions decrease the relative nominal wage of the poor and the relative price
index for the poor in all countries. On net, real-wage inequality falls everywhere.
Chapter 3, “Imported Inputs and Within-Sector Wage Dispersion,” proposes a new mech-
anism through which trade liberalization a↵ects income inequality within a country: the use
of imported inputs. Intuitively, a firm with higher initial productivity is better at using higher
quality foreign inputs. This justifies paying the fixed costs for a larger set of imported inputs
when input tari↵ liberalization decreases their relative price. The firm becomes more im-
port intensive, which enhances its productivity advantage. As a result, the firm hires higher
quality workers, produces higher quality products and pays higher wages to its workers, in-
creasing within-sector wage dispersion. We find that both the mean and the dispersion of
the distribution of firm productivity, markup and size went up during a period when China
reduced its tari↵s on imported inputs. More importantly, these results still hold when we
consider the subset of firms that survived throughout the sample period, from 1998 to 2007.
In addition, we develop a partial-equilibrium, heterogeneous-firm model with endogenous im-
ported inputs and labor quality choice that is consistent with these observations. Finally, we
provide empirical evidence that supports the model’s prediction that the di↵erential change
in the import intensity of firms with di↵erent productivity levels explains these patterns.
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Chapter 1
Trade and Real Wages with Demand
and Productivity Heterogeneity
Zheli He and Feiran Zhang
1
1.1 Introduction
Trade liberalization may impact an individual’s real wage through her nominal wage and
her consumer price index. The change in her nominal wage depends on changes in producer
prices and the job in which she is employed, where the job of her employment is determined
by her characteristics such as age, gender and educational attainment. On the other hand,
the change in her consumer price index depends on changes in prices of the basket of goods
that she consumes, where her consumption basket is determined by her nominal wage in
addition to prices. A vast majority of the literature focuses on the e↵ect of trade on the
distribution of nominal wages. A small number of studies consider its di↵erential impact on
consumer price indices. In this paper, we provide a unified framework that incorporates both
the expenditure channel, i.e., changing consumer price indices, and the income channel, i.e.,
changing nominal wages, to measure the distributional e↵ects of trade in a large cross-section
of countries.1
We build a model combining demand heterogeneity across consumers with productivity
heterogeneity across workers. On the demand side, we use the Almost Ideal Demand System
(AIDS) to capture non-homothetic preferences. This demand specification allows the con-
sumption baskets of high-income and low-income individuals to di↵er so that price changes
resulting from trade liberalization have a di↵erential impact on their consumer price indices.
On the supply side, we use an assignment model of the labor market parametrized with a
Fréchet distribution to capture heterogeneity of workers across jobs. Individuals have com-
parative advantage across sectors—based on their age, gender and educational attainment—
1We focus on labor earnings, which are the main source of income for most people.
2
and, therefore, sort into di↵erent sectors. Consequently, price changes resulting from trade
liberalization have a di↵erential impact on individuals’ nominal wages depending on the sec-
tors in which they work. In addition, we also allow individuals to di↵er in their absolute
advantage such that labor groups di↵er in their average productivity and, therefore, have
di↵erent nominal wages regardless of individuals’ sectoral choices.2 This assumption gener-
ates a potential link between the skill distribution and the wage distribution and, as a result,
a potential correlation between the change in an individual’s nominal wage and the change
in her consumer price index.
A vast body of research has examined the impact of trade on the distribution of earn-
ings across workers. Most recently, Galle et al. (2015) develop the notion of “risk-adjusted
gains from trade” to evaluate the full distribution of welfare changes in one measure which
generalizes the specific-factors intuition to a setting with endogenous labor allocation. Sim-
ilarly, we focus on changes in relative nominal wages across labor groups that result from
changes in relative demand across sectors driven by international trade.3 There is a small
number of studies that have considered price indices as a channel through which trade lib-
eralization can a↵ect inequality. For example, Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) develop
a methodology to measure the unequal gains from trade through the expenditure channel
using only aggregate statistics. We extend this approach to incorporate the di↵erential im-
2Workers in a labor group share the same observable characteristics such as age, gender and educational
attainment.
3See also Adão (2015), Burstein et al. (2015) and Dix-Carneiro and Rafael (2015). We don’t incorporate
some of the mechanisms that have been studied in the literature linking international trade to inequality
through the earnings channel. For example, Yeaple (2005), Verhoogen (2008), Bustos (2011), Burstein and
Vogel (2016) and Bloom et al. (2015) show that trade liberalization increases the measured skill bias of
technology by reallocating resources from less to more skill-intensive firms within industries and/or inducing
firms to increase their skill intensity. A major di culty is the lack of a comprehensive, matched employer-
employee dataset in many countries that covers the period of rising inequality which is usually confidential.
3
pact of trade liberalization on individuals’ nominal wages. In contrast, Faber (2014) exploits
barcode level microdata from the Mexican Consumer Price Index and studies the relative
price e↵ect of NAFTA on the di↵erential change in the cost of living between rich and poor
households. Fally and Faber (2016) use detailed matched US home and store scanner mi-
crodata to explore the implications of firm heterogeneity for household price indices across
the income distribution. We complement the existing literature by incorporating both the
expenditure and the income channels as well as their interaction in a unified framework to
analyze the heterogeneous impact of counterfactual trade shocks across individuals in a large
set of countries.
To our knowledge, there are only three case studies that have looked at these two channels
jointly.4 Porto (2006) studies the distributional e↵ects of Mercosur, a regional trade agree-
ment among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, during the 1990s. Nicita (2009)
extends Porto’s approach by adding a link from trade policy to domestic prices and studies
the trade liberalization that took place in Mexico during the period 1990-2000. Marchand
(2012) allows the tari↵ pass-through to di↵er across geographical regions and studies the
trade reforms in India between 1988 and 2000. The structure of our model allows us to
estimate the e↵ects for more countries. By looking at a wide range of countries, we are able
to identify general patterns across countries with di↵erent characteristics. We are also able
to conduct model-based counterfactuals of di↵erent trade shocks which are important for
policymakers. In addition, as critiqued in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), the predictions of
these studies depend in a crucial way on estimates of the degree of pass-through from trade
4Atkin et al. (2016) draw on a new collection of Mexican microdata to estimate the e↵ect of foreign
supermarket entry on household welfare. They do consider both the price index e↵ect and the income e↵ect,
but focus only on the gains from retail FDI.
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policy changes to product prices as well as the wage-price elasticities. These are di cult
to estimate consistently with time-series data on wages and prices in a setting when many
other policies change contemporaneously with trade.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 The Environment
We study an economy with N countries indexed by n 2 N = {1, . . . , N} and J final good
sectors indexed by j 2 J = {1, . . . J}. Each good is defined as a sector-country of origin pair.
Within any (j, n) 2 J ⇥N , output is homogeneous, and the market is perfectly competitive.
In country n, there is a continuum of heterogeneous workers indexed by z 2 Zn with measure
Ln. They are grouped into a finite number of types indexed by   2 ⇤ with measure Ln ( )
based on observable characteristics: age, gender and education. We assume that types are
mutually exclusive: Zn ( ) \ Zn ( 0) = ;, 8  6=  0.
1.2.2 Definition of Welfare Change







, and log-wages, {cwz}z2Zh .5 We define the local welfare change of













5 [ph(j,n) ⌘ d ln(p
h
(j,n)) is the infinitesimal change in the log of prices and cwz ⌘ d ln(wz) is the infinitesimal
change in the log of wages.
6Please see Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the local welfare change as the equivalent variation.
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Here, sz
(j,n) is the initial individual expenditure share on good (j, n). An individual’s welfare
is a↵ected in two ways. The first is the change in her cost of living resulting from the change
in prices which we refer to as the expenditure e↵ect. Specifically, it is the price change
applied to the pre-shock expenditure shares. A decrease in prices reduces the cost of living,
and therefore increases an individual’s welfare. The second is the change in her nominal
wage which we refer to as the income e↵ect.




















































buz = cEh+c z+cwz, that is, the total e↵ect is the sum of the aggregate expenditure e↵ect, cEh,
the individual expenditure e↵ect, c z and the income e↵ect, cwz. Sh
(j,n) is country h
0s aggregate
expenditure share on good (j, n). We can think of the aggregate expenditure e↵ect as the
impact of trade liberalization on the cost of living under homothetic preferences where the
ratios of goods demanded by consumers depend only on relative prices, not on income or
scale. This e↵ect is the same across all individuals within a country h. On the other hand,
the individual expenditure e↵ect implies that if individual z spends more on good (j, n),
then the price decrease of that good increases her welfare by a larger amount.
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1.2.3 Non-homothetic Preferences
We use the Almost-Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to capture the non-homotheticity in con-
sumer preferences. It gives an arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system
and satisfies the axioms of order, aggregates over consumers without invoking parallel linear
Engel curves, is consistent with budget constraints, and is simple to estimate. The AIDS
allows consumption baskets of high-income and low-income individuals to di↵er so that price
changes resulting from trade liberalization have a di↵erential impact on their consumer price
indices. It belongs to the family of Log Price-Independent Generalized Prefereces defined by














where F [·] is a continuous, di↵erentiable, and strictly increasing function. The AIDS is the






















































is a homothetic price aggregator which captures the cost of a subsistence basket
of consumption goods. ↵ is the outlay required for a minimal standard of living when prices
are unity. ↵h
(j,n) is importer h’s taste for good (j, n).  (j,n)(j0,n0) is the cross elasticity between




is a non-homothetic price aggregator which captures the
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relative price of high-income elastic goods. Goods for which  
(j,n) > 0 have positive income
elasticity, while goods for which  
(j,n) < 0 have negative income elasticity. For AIDS to be


















(j,n)(j0,n0) = 0 8 (j0, n0) (1.8)
 
(j,n)(j0,n0) =  (j0,n0)(j,n) 8 (j, n) , (j0, n0) (1.9)
Applying Shephard’s Lemma to the indirect utility function, we can derive the individual






















According to this equation, if a consumer has relatively low nominal wage, then she spends
relatively more on low-income elastic goods. Under the AIDS, we can describe the market
by the behavior of a respresentative consumer with the inequality-adjusted average nominal
wage, w̃h = w̄he⌃
h











, a measure of inequality within a country. It is therefore
straightforward to derive the aggregate expenditure shares in country h:
7Under these constraints, the budget shares equations share the properties of a demand function, that
is, they are homogeneous of degree 0 in prices and total expenditure, sum of budget shares add up to 1 and


























, if country h has higher inequality-adjusted
average nominal wage, w̃h, either because of higher average nominal wage or higher inequality,
then it spends relatively more on high-income elastic goods.





























Intuitively, for an individual z who has lower nominal wage relative to the representative
consumer in the country, if the price of a low-income elastic good goes down, she’s going
to be better o↵ and vice versa. Note that we don’t have to observe each individual z’s
expenditure share on each good (j, n) in order to compute the change in her consumer price
index.
Plugging in the above expression forc z, we can write the local welfare change of individual
z under the AIDS that corresponds to an infinitesimal change in prices and nominal wages
as follows:





bbh + cwz (1.13)
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The global welfare change of individual z under the AIDS between an initial scenario under

































































) are functions of the set of prices in the two scenarios, the
aggregate expenditure shares that are observed in the data and a model parameter,  
(j,n). If
utr!cfz < 1, individual z is worse o↵ after the change and vice versa.
1.2.4 Heterogeneous Labor with Comparative Advantage across
Sectors
Our supply-side specification allows for heterogeneous labor with comparative advantage
across sectors so that di↵erent labor types sort into di↵erent sectors and prices changes
resulting from trade liberalization have a di↵erential impact on their nominal wages. We
use an assignment model of the labor market parameterized with a Fréchet distribution. In
this environment, workers with di↵erent unobservable characteristics but identical observ-
able characteristics may be allocated to di↵erent sectors in a competitive equilibrium. In
8Please see Appendix A.2 for the derivation of the aggregate and individual expenditure e↵ects between
an initial scenario under trade and a counterfactual scenario.
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particular, an arbitrary worker z of type   draws a vector of e ciency units across di↵erent
sectors from a multivariate Fréchet distribution:9










where ✓( ) > 1 governs within-type dispersion of e ciency units. Worker z inelastically
supplies ✏ (z; j) e ciency units of labor if she chooses to work in sector j.
Production requires only one factor, labor.10 The production function in country h, sector
j, using l e ciency units of labor type   is:11
yh (l; , j) = Ah( )T ( , j)l (1.18)
Ah( ) is the productivity of type   workers in country h and T ( , j) is the productivity of
type   workers who choose to work in sector j. Ah( ) captures the absolute advantage of
type   workers in country h. T ( , j) captures the comparative advantage of type   workers







Perfect competition and free entry entail that the per e ciency unit wage xh ( , j) of a
9Fréchet distributions of productivity shocks across factors have been imposed in the recent closed-
economy models of Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Hsieh et al. (2013) as well as the open economy models
of Burstein et al. (2015), Costinot et al. (2016), and Fajgelbaum and Redding (2014). Sector and country
characteristics are assumed to be perfectly observed by the econometrician, but factor characteristics are
not. See Costinot and Vogel (2015) for a detailed discussion.
10We do not feature complementarity between di↵erent types of equipment and heterogeneous workers
across sectors as in Burstein et al. (2015) because we do not have data to compute the share of total hours
worked by each labor group that is spent using di↵erent equipment types across sectors.
11Our model does not feature Ricardian-type country-sector productivity. However, we demonstrate in
Appendix A.3 that we are not understating the specialization of skill-abundant countries in skill-intensive
sectors.
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worker of labor type   working in sector j in country h is:
xh ( , j) = ph
(j,h)A
h( )T ( , j) (1.19)
Worker z 2 Zh ( ) with realization of the vector of e ciency units ✏ (z) = {✏ (z; j)}j2J needs
to choose the sector that maximizes her labor earnings which is the product of her draw of
e ciency units and per e ciency unit wage:
wz = max
j
wz (j) = ✏ (z; j) · xh ( , j) (1.20)
The multivariate Fréchet distribution implies that the probability of a type   worker choosing
to work in sector j in country h is:

























. With a higher ✓( ), which implies that there is less
dispersion of e ciency units across sectors, a change in price or a change in productivity
a↵ects the factor allocation even more.


























If type  0 workers (relative to type   workers) have a comparative advantage in sector j0
(relative to sector j), then they are relatively more likely to sort into sector j0, adjusted
for potentially di↵erent values of ✓ ( ) and ✓ ( 0). For larger ✓ ( 0) (i.e. less dispersion in
e ciency units among type  0 workers), it is even more likely for them to sort into sector j0,
in which they have a comparative advantage.
The distribution for wz = maxj wz (j) conditional on z 2 Zh ( ) is:
Pr
 







It is also distributed Fréchet with the scale parameter, xh( ), the average per e ciency unit
wage of labor type   across the sectors, along with the dispersion parameter, ✓( ).
The average nominal wage, w̄h, and the Theil index,
Ph, in country h can also be




















  ln w̄h (1.25)


































(j,h) 8j 2 J (1.26)
where yh = Ah( )T ( , j) ( )⇡h( , j)1 
1
✓( )Lh( ) is the supply of sector j good by labor type
  in country h.12 ⌧n
(j,h) is the bilateral trade cost between export country h and import








(j,h) is country n’s demand for good (j, h),
where Sn
(j,h) is given in equation (11) and w̄
n in equation (24). It depends on country n’s
wage distribution (in particular w̄n and ⌃n) as well as the vector of prices that consumers





(j,h)). Since these output prices enter
both the demand side and the supply side nonlinearly, we apply the Gauss-Jacobi algorithm,
an iterative method, to solve the system of market clearing equations numerically.13 We
also appeal to the Implicit Function Theorem to show that the price equilibrium that we
have found numerically is locally isolated as a function of the parameters.14 That is, in
response to a small perturbation, if there exists an equilibrium, then the system stays in the
neighborhood of that equilibrium. We find no quantitative evidence of multiple equilibria.15
12Please see Appendix A.4 for the derivation of the total supply.
13We demonstrate existence of an equilibrium numerically.
14Please refer to Appendix A.5 for a brief discussion of the Gauss-Jacobi Algorithm and the local property
of the equilibrium.
15We have tried multiple starting points and the system always converges to the same equilibrium.
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1.3 Conclusion
Trade liberalization may impact an individual’s real wage through her nominal wage and
her consumer price index. The change in her nominal wage depends on changes in producer
prices and the job in which she is employed, where the job of her employment is determined
by her characteristics such as age, gender and educational attainment. On the other hand,
the change in her consumer price index depends on changes in prices of the basket of goods
that she consumes, where her consumption basket is determined by her nominal wage in
addition to prices. A vast majority of the literature focuses on the e↵ect of trade on the
distribution of nominal wages. A small number of studies consider its di↵erential impact on
consumer price indices. In this paper, we provide a unified framework that incorporates both
the expenditure channel, i.e., changing consumer price indices, and the income channel, i.e.,
changing nominal wages, to measure the distributional e↵ects of trade in a large cross-section
of countries.
In order to allow price indices to vary across consumers within a country, we need demand
heterogeneity. We use the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to capture non-homothetic
preferences. This demand specification allows the consumption baskets of high-income and
low-income individuals to di↵er so that price changes resulting from trade liberalization
have a di↵erential impact on their consumer price indices. In order to allow nominal wages
to vary across workers within a country, we need productivity heterogeneity. We use an
assignment model of the labor market to capture heterogeneity of workers across jobs. Indi-
viduals have comparative advantage across sectors and, therefore, sort into di↵erent sectors.
Consequently, price changes resulting from trade liberalization have a di↵erential impact on
15
individuals’ nominal wages depending on the sectors in which they work.
This model with demand heterogeneity across consumers and productivity heterogeneity
across workers can be used to quantify the distributional e↵ects of trade liberalization for
a wide range of countries. By looking at a large set of countries, we are able to identify
general patterns across countries with di↵erent characteristics. We are also able to conduct
model-based counterfactuals of di↵erent trade shocks, which are important for policymakers.
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Chapter 2





Trade liberalization a↵ects real wage inequality through two channels: the distribution of
nominal wages across workers and, if the rich and the poor consume di↵erent bundles of
goods, the distribution of price indices across consumers. Prior work has focused mostly
on one or the other of these channels, but no paper has studied both jointly for a large
set of countries. Based on the theoretical framework in Chapter 1, I measure the distribu-
tional e↵ects of trade liberalization incorporating both channels for a sample of 40 countries.
Because skill-intensive goods are also high-income elastic in the data, I find an intuitive,
previously unexplored, and strong interaction between these two channels. According to
my counterfactual analysis, trade cost reductions generate dramatically di↵erent results for
both nominal wage inequality and price index inequality than what previous research has
obtained by focusing on either channel alone.
In isolation, these two channels have well-understood implications. Shutting down the
expenditure channel, I find that the income channel benefits the poor more than the rich
in low-income countries and the rich more than the poor in high-income countries. This is
consistent with standard factor proportions theory in which a reduction in trade costs raises
the relative nominal wage of the abundant factor in every country, benefiting the unskilled
(and poor) workers in skill-scarce countries that are low income and the skilled (and rich)
workers in skill-abundant countries that are high income. Shutting down the income channel,
I find that the expenditure channel benefits the poor more than the rich in every country
and more so in high-income countries. Intuitively, lower trade costs increase real incomes
and, therefore, decrease the relative demand for and the relative price of low-income elastic
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goods. Because low-income consumers spend more on these goods, they benefit relatively
more. The expenditure channel benefits the poor relatively more in high-income countries
because these countries are net importers of low-income elastic goods.
These two channels do not work in isolation. Studying either channel in the absence of
the other leads to profoundly biased results qualitatively and quantitatively. Specifically,
their interaction implies that the income channel benefits the rich in every country, which
is consistent with a large body of empirical evidence; see e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
Intuitively, when both channels are active, lower trade costs increase real incomes and,
therefore, decrease the relative demand for and the relative price of low-income elastic goods
as discussed above. Since the poor disproportionately produce unskill-intensive goods, which
are low-income elastic, their relative nominal wage falls in every country. This e↵ect is absent
when only the income channel is active. Moreover, the interaction of these two mechanisms
also implies that the poor’s relative benefit from the expenditure channel is magnified in
every country. Intuitively, because nominal wage inequality rises in every country, as just
described, the relative demand for and the relative price of low-income elastic goods fall even
further, reducing the relative price index for the poor in every country. This e↵ect is absent
when only the expenditure channel is active because nominal wage inequality is constant in
that case.
I parametrize the model for a sample of 40 countries (27 European countries and 13
other large countries) and 35 sectors using a range of datasets including the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD) and the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International
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(IPUMS-I). WIOD provides information on bilateral trade flows and production data.1 I
derive a sectoral non-homothetic gravity equation that allows me to estimate the elasticity
of substitution and the income elasticity of goods as follows.2 First, I estimate the elasticity
of substitution by projecting countries’ sectoral expenditure shares on trade costs. Second,
I estimate the income elasticity of each good using the following insight: if high-income
or more unequal countries spend relatively more on a good, then I infer that this good is
high-income elastic. IPUMS-I provides publicly available nationally representative survey
data for 82 countries that are coded and documented consistently across countries and over
time. It reports individual-level information including age, gender, educational attainment,
labor income and sector of work. This rich database enables me to estimate the Fréchet
dispersion parameter of the within-group distribution of e ciency units across sectors which
determines the extent of worker reallocation and, thus, the responsiveness of group average
wages to changes in sectoral output prices. In addition, I am able to estimate the comparative
advantage of di↵erent labor groups across sectors based on observed worker sorting patterns.
Intuitively, if a worker type (relative to another worker type) is more likely to sort into a
sector (relative to another sector), then I infer that they are relatively more productive in
that sector. Using the estimates of group average wages and other parameters, I can back
out the absolute advantage of di↵erent labor groups.
With these parameter estimates, I conduct two counterfactual analyses to quantify the
distributional e↵ects of trade liberalization. To demonstrate how the model works, I begin
with a simple counterfactual exercise in which I consider a 5% reduction in all bilateral trade
1One important feature of the WIOD is that it includes the input-output transactions of a country with
itself. Typically, the domestic market accounts for the large marjority of demand for most production.
2The sectoral non-homothetic gravity equation based on the AIDS was first dervied in Fajgelbaum and
Khandelwal (2016). However, their model assumptions imply that the change in income is 0 for all consumers.
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costs. I find that the average welfare gain across the 40 countries is about 1.2%, which is in
line with the previous literature that abstracts from relative e↵ects across individuals within
countries.3 Within each country, as I move up the initial nominal wage distribution, gains
decline. Specifically, moving up from one decile to the next reduces gains by 0.1 percentage
point: the bottom 10th percentile experiences a real wage gain that is larger than the top
10th percentile in every country, and the di↵erence is 0.8 percentage points in the average
country. These results highlight that the distributional e↵ects of trade liberalization are large
compared to its average e↵ect. I obtain the result that the poor gain relative to the rich in
spite of the fact that I find the opposite result for nominal wages. In the average country, the
bottom 10th percentile see their nominal wages decrease by 0.2 percentage points relative
to the top 10th percentile. Hence, the reduction in the poor’s relative price index must fall
substantially. In the average country, the bottom 10th percentile see their consumer price
indices decrease by 1 percentage point more than the top 10th percentile.
The theoretical framework in Chapter 1 also allows me to re-examine the impact of a
significant increase in U.S. manufacturing imports from China on U.S. real-wage inequality
while accounting for both channels and their interaction.4 I consider a uniform reduction in
trade costs between the U.S. and China that would yield a $1000 per U.S. worker increase
in Chinese manufacturing imports. I find that this reduction in trade costs decreases the
consumer price index for a U.S. representative consumer by 0.85%. Individuals whose nom-
inal wages are at the 10th percentile of the initial distribution see a further 0.35 percentage
3Eaton and Kortum (2002) consider a counterfactual where the 19 OECD countries collectively remove
the 5 percent tari↵ on all imports and find that most countries gain around one percent.
4Autor et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) study the impact of increased Chinese
import competition on employment and earnings of U.S. workers by comparing more a↵ected industries and
local labor markets to less a↵ected ones but have no implications at the aggregate level.
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point reduction in their consumer price indices compared to the representative consumer,
while individuals whose nominal wages are at the 90th percentile see their consumer price
indices decrease by 0.1 percentage point less than the representative consumer. This result
arises because Chinese manufacturing goods are low-income elastic and, consequently, their
lower prices benefit more the poor individuals who spend relatively more on these goods.
Although the former see a bigger decline in their nominal wages (0.13% vs. 0.11%) because
they are more likely to work in manufacturing sectors that are in direct competition with
cheaper Chinese imports, this income e↵ect is more than o↵set by their much lower consumer
price indices. Rising Chinese import competition increases the real wage of the poor by 0.43
percentage points more than that of the rich in the U.S.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 contains a description of
the data, and estimation strategy and results are gathered in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, I
discuss my counterfactual results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
For the demand-side estimation, I use mainly the World Input-Output Database (WIOD),
which provides information on bilateral trade flows and production data for 40 countries (27
European countries and 13 other large countries) and 35 sectors in the economy. It also
distinguishes between final consumption and intermediate uses.5
World Input-Output Table looks like Figure 2.1:
5I do not use the UN Comtrade Database because it does not have information on the input-output
transactions of a country with itself.
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Figure 2.1: Schematic Outline of a World Input-Output Table (WIOT)
For the supply-side estimation, I use mainly the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
International (IPUMS-I), which provides publicly available nationally representative survey
data for 82 countries that are coded and documented consistently across countries and over
time and individual-level data with labor incomes and worker characteristics. I divide the
workers in IPUMS-I dataset into 18 disjoint groups, ⇤, by age (15-24, 25-49 and 50-74),
gender (male and female) and educational attainment (ED0-2, less than primary, primary
and lower secondary education; ED3-4, upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
education; ED5-8, tertiary education).
2.3 Parametrization
2.3.1 Supply-side Parameters
On the supply side, I need to estimate ✓( ), the worker type specific Fréchet dispersion
parameter, Lh( )/Lh, the fraction of type   workers in country h, Ah( ), the productivity
of type   workers in country h and T ( , j), the productivity of type   workers who choose
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to work in sector j.
To estimate the worker type specific Fréchet dispersion parameter ✓ ( ), I follow the
methodology in Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Hsieh et al. (2013) and match the moments
of the empirical distribution of within type worker wages.6 In particular, the mean and the
variance of nominal wages within a labor group satisfy:
V AR
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I restrict my sample in the following way: I drop workers who are younger than 15 years
old, are self-employed or work part-time (<30 hours per week), do not report positive labor
earnings, or have missing information on age, sex or education. I also drop the top and
bottom 1% of earners to remove potential outliers, and to minimize the impact of poten-
tial cross-country di↵erences in top-coding procedures. All calculations in my analysis are
weighted using the applicable sample weights. I measure wz as the annual labor earnings;
✏(z; j) captures both the hours worked and e ciency units of worker z who chooses to work in
sector j; ✓( ) reflects dispersion in both hours worked and e ciency units of type   workers;
Lh( ) is the headcount of type   workers.
I use IPUMS-I to estimate ✓( ) for 16 countries.7 Since the estimates of ✓( ) are very
close across the 16 countries for each labor type  , I use the average of these estimates
for all countries and assume that ✓( ) doesn’t change over time. I back out xh( ) using
6As a robustness check, I also jointly estimate ✓( ) and xh( ) for each labor type using maximum
likelihood.








) for the 16 countries. Since all earnings data in IPUMS-
I are in local currency units, I use the o cial exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average)
from the World Bank to convert all values to US$. I also find that output-side real GDP
per capita have strong explanatory power for xh( ), so I use the predicted values of xh( )
for the rest of the countries.8
Since IPUMS-I does not provide information on Lh( )/Lh for all of the 40 countries, I
use the following complementary datasets. First, I use Eurostat which provides information
on the full-time and part-time employment by age, gender and educational attainment; it
includes 27 European countries in WIOD. Second, I use UNdata which has information
on population 15 years of age and over, also by age, gender and educational attainment,
for Russia, Australia, Korea and China. This dataset comes from UNSD Demographic
Statistics–United Nations Statistics Division. Third, I use National Statistics, Republic of
China (Taiwan) and finally, Population Statistics of Japan.
In order to estimate the sector-level non-homothetic gravity equation, which I explain in
detail in the next section, I need to compute the inequality-adjusted average nominal wage
of each country, which requires an estimate of its average nominal wage as well as its Theil
index. Table 2.1 reports my estimates of the average labor earnings and the Theil index for
the 40 countries based on equations (24) and (25). I estimate w̄h and
Ph for the years 2005,
2006 and 2007, and then take the average.
8I get the data on output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in millions of 2005 US$) and population from
the Penn World Tables.
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Country Theil Avg Labor Earnings Country Theil Avg Labor Earnings
AUS 0.17 35871 IRL 0.18 45164
AUT 0.18 31585 ITA 0.17 25381
BEL 0.17 31446 JPN 0.17 30438
BGR 0.19 7196 KOR 0.18 23422
BRA 0.32 2835 LTU 0.17 11927
CAN 0.17 37134 LUX 0.17 60919
CHN 0.34 1661 LVA 0.18 9889
CYP 0.18 17773 MEX 0.23 3813
CZE 0.17 18342 MLT 0.20 13412
DEU 0.16 33901 NLD 0.17 39566
DNK 0.17 34748 POL 0.17 11096
ESP 0.19 25098 PRT 0.19 14326
EST 0.17 14544 ROU 0.19 6365
FIN 0.17 32274 RUS 0.18 11210
FRA 0.18 27794 SVK 0.17 12936
GBR 0.18 31318 SVN 0.17 19767
GRC 0.18 20335 SWE 0.17 33596
HUN 0.17 12821 TUR 0.21 6884
IDN 0.20 1378 TWN 0.21 21729
IND 0.40 737 USA 0.19 41898
Table 2.1: Average Labor Earnings and Theil Index
Recall that the Theil index measures the level of inequality within a country, which in
my framework is the dispersion in labor incomes. Since my Theil indices are calculated
using only the labor earnings of the population aged between 15 and 74, I also use IPUMS-I
to construct alternative measures of wage Gini coe cients using three di↵erent methods
that are widely used in the literature. Let yi be the labor income of a person indexed in
non-decreasing order (yi  yi+1), my first two measures of the wage Gini coe cents are
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i=1 PiXi) where µ is mean income of the population, Pi is the income
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Figure 2.2: Wage Gini Coe cient Calculated Using IPUMS-I
the poorest a rank of N . The three methods give me very similar estimates and Figure 2.2
demonstrates that my model-implied Theil indices perform very well against the Jasso and
Deaton measure. Their correlation is significantly positive at 0.89.
I plot in Figure 2.3 my model-implied Theil indices for all of the 40 countries against the
Gini coe cients reported in the World Income Inequality Database that are computed using
all sources of income. The two measures are still positively correlated and the correlation
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Figure 2.3: Theil Index
In Figure 2.4, I plot my model-implied labor earnings per capita against output-side GDP
per capita. My measure of income per capita tracks the data very well. These parameter



























































0 20000 40000 60000
Output-side GDP per capita
Figure 2.4: Average Labor Earnings
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As discussed above, the worker sorting pattern can be used to parametrize T ( , j). I
need ⇤ + J   1 = 52 normalization. I pick   = 1 such that T ( , j0) = 1 8j0. I also pick
























8 0 6= 1 8j0 6= 1 where ⇡h( , j) = Lh( , j)/Lh( ) and Lh( , j) is the headcount of type
  workers in country h that choose to work in sector j. Since there is no information on
Lh( , j) in Eurostat or UNdata, I use data on the countries that are available in IPUMS-I














I plot in Figure 2.5 this ratio aggregating the 18 labor groups into three broad categories
based on educational attainment against an estimate of the skill intensity of each sector
which matches the share of hours worked in that sector by workers with a completed tertiary
degree in the U.S.1011 These graphs illustrate that workers with less education are more likely
to work in unskill-intensive sectors. This implies that a decline in the relative price of goods
in unskill-intensive sectors decreases the relative nominal wage of unskilled workers.12
To estimate Ah( ), the productivity of type   workers in country h, I take a first-order
approximation of the following equation at p = 1, T = 1:
9This restriction implies, for example, a U.S. and a Chinese female worker who are 25-year-old and
college educated are both twice as productive in health care than in mining. Because of data limitations,
I cannot estimate T ( , j) for every country. This restriction is reasonable and does well in capturing the
systematic relationship between the di↵erent labor types and the sectors that they sort into.
10ED1 corresponds to less than primary, primary and lower secondary education; ED2 corresponds to
upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education; ED3 corresponds to tertiary education.
11I thank Jonathan Vogel for providing me with these estimates.
12In partial equilibrium, changes in wages are proportinal to changes in output prices, where the weight
depends on factor allocation in the initial period. An increase in sector j’s output price raises the relative
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I assume that Ah(  = 1) = 1 8h.14 Figure 2.6 is a bar chart that plots the average Ah( )
across countries for each of the 18 labor goups by age, gender and educational attainment.
13Please see Appendix B.2 for the derivation of equation (2.4).









































Figure 2.6: Ah( ) and Education
As expected, for those who are of the same age and gender, the less education one receives,
the lower the average estimate of Ah( ). In addition, for those who are of the same gender
and have the same level of education, the younger one is, the lower the average estimate
of Ah( ). Finally, a female worker is estimated to have lower average Ah( ) than her male
counterpart. Zooming in on education, I aggregate the 18 labor groups into three broad
categories. The bar chart on the right illustrates that less educated individuals have lower
Ah( ) on average regardless of their age and gender. This implies that less educated workers
have lower nominal wages regardless of their sectoral choices.
2.3.2 Demand-side Parameters
On the demand side, I need to estimate ↵, which can be interpreted as the outlay required
for a minimal standard of living when prices are unity. I assign 0 to ↵ a priori. I also need to












, as well as ↵h
(j,n), the overall taste in country h for the goods exported by
country n in sector j independently from prices or income of the importer.
On top of the regularity restrictions imposed by the AIDS, I impose additional assump-






























 j j = j0, n = n0
0 j 6= j0
(2.5)
In words, this implies that within the same sector, cross elasticities are the same between
goods produced by di↵erent countries and across sectors, there is no substitution.15



















































captures bilateral trade costs and multilateral re-










is the non-homothetic component of the gravity
equation. For example, a country with a high ⌦h, either because of its high average nominal
wage or its high inequality, is predicted to consume more of the high-income elastic goods.
Following Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016), I proxy Kh
(j,n) with the product of the
15Normalization by the number of countries N is mainly for notational simplicity and is not necessary.
16Please see Appendix B.4 for the derivation of the sector-level non-homothetic gravity equation.
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exporter fixed e↵ect and country h’s expenditure share on sector j relative to the world.
Since I do not observe directly the trade costs between country pairs, I proxy them with
bilateral observables.
To be more specific, I assume importer h’s taste for good (j, n), ↵h
(j,n), can be decomposed



































(j,n) and  ̄j =
P
n  (j,n). In the absence of non-homotheticity,  ̄j = 08j. In




j2J . I further
impose the restriction:
PN















where bilateral distance, common language and border information are obtained from CEPII’s
Gravity database. This re-expresses Mh






























and Lhn and B
h
n are defined in the
17Please see Appendix B.5 for the derivation of Kh(j,n).
33
same way. To separately identify  j, I again follow Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) and
set the elasticity of trade cost with respect to distance ⇢j = ⇢ = 0.177.18














Ph. I proxy the homothetic







⇢), where pnn are the
quality-adjusted prices estimated by Feenstra and Romalis (2014). I obtain estimates of w̄h
and
Ph from the supply side as reported in the last section.




























(j,n) =  (j,n)   an ̄j. To separately identify  (j,n), I need to estimate an (in the same
equation) and  ̄j =
P










h = aj +  ̄jyh + "hj . The
left-hand side of the equation is computed from WIOD, using average flows between 2005
and 2007 to smooth out any temporary shocks. In the benchmark, I compute expenditure
shares as percentages of total expenditure. As a robustness check, I compute expenditure
shares as percentages of final consumption expenditure.
Table 2.2 reports my estimates of the cross-substitution elasticities between di↵erent
suppliers of a good within each sector. Note that the sector-level non-homothetic gravity
equations add up to a single-sector gravity equation. The sum of my estimates of  j across
sectors is 0.24. It is very close to the estimate in Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016).
Estimating a translog gravity equation, Novy (2013) reports   = 0.167 while Feenstra and
Weinstein (2010) reports a median   of 0.19.
18Alternatively, I can estimate  
j
for each non-service sector separately using tari↵s as a trade cost
shifter as in Caliendo and Parro (2015). Bilateral tari↵ data at the sector level can be obtained from the
UNCTAD-TRAINS.
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sector  j -total  j -final sector  j -total  j -final
Agriculture 0.0060 0.0048 Sales, Repair of Motor Vehicles 0.0030 0.0030
Mining 0.0029 0.0008 Wholesale Trade and Comission Trade 0.0115 0.0121
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.0086 0.0102 Retail Trade 0.0104 0.0131
Textiles 0.0021 0.0017 Hotels and Restaurants 0.0074 0.0109
Leather and Footwear 0.0004 0.0004 Inland Transport 0.0046 0.0042
Wood Products 0.0013 0.0003 Water Transport 0.0006 0.0001
Printing and Publishing 0.0037 0.0017 Air Transport 0.0013 0.0012
Coke, Refined Petroleum, Nuclear Fule 0.0045 0.0023 Other Auxilliary Transport Activities 0.0025 0.0015
Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.0068 0.0022 Post and Telecommunications 0.0058 0.0051
Rubber and Plastics 0.0026 0.0006 Financial Intermediation 0.0180 0.0102
Other Non-Metallic Minerals 0.0028 0.0007 Real Estate Activities 0.0179 0.0252
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.0103 0.0021 Renting of M&Eq 0.0158 0.0058
Machinery 0.0047 0.0048 Public Admin and Defense 0.0166 0.0317
Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.0081 0.0048 Education 0.0067 0.0133
Transport Equipment 0.0058 0.0052 Health and Social Work 0.0103 0.0204
Manufacturing, nec 0.0015 0.0019 Other Community and Social Services 0.0101 0.0143
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0.0072 0.0042 Private Households with Employed Persons 0.0003 0.0006
Construction 0.0215 0.0364 sum 0.2433 0.2580
Table 2.2: Cross-substitution between Goods
35
Table 2.3 reports my estimates of the sectoral income elasticities,  j =
P
n  (j,n). The
corresponding elasticities for food, manufacturing and services are -0.022, -0.0051 and 0.0271,
respectively. I find that the service sectors have a higher income elasticity as expected.
sector  j -total  j -final sector  j -total  j -final
Agriculture -0.0128 -0.0117 Sales, Repair of Motor Vehicles 0.0020 0.0022
Mining -0.0052 -0.0002 Wholesale Trade and Comission Trade -0.0001 -0.0008
Food, Beverages and Tobacco -0.0080 -0.0103 Retail Trade -0.0011 0.0000
Textiles -0.0034 -0.0024 Hotels and Restaurants 0.0004 0.0016
Leather and Footwear -0.0005 -0.0004 Inland Transport -0.0041 -0.0044
Wood Products -0.0006 0.0002 Water Transport -0.0008 -0.0012
Printing and Publishing 0.0007 0.0012 Air Transport 0.0003 0.0002
Coke, Refined Petroleum, Nuclear Fule -0.0017 0.0004 Other Auxilliary Transport Activities 0.0024 0.0011
Chemicals and Chemical Products -0.0027 -0.0009 Post and Telecommunications 0.0005 0.0002
Rubber and Plastics -0.0005 -0.0003 Financial Intermediation 0.0117 0.0032
Other Non-Metallic Minerals -0.0009 0.0000 Real Estate Activities 0.0059 0.00106
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.0004 0.0004 Renting of M&Eq 0.0131 0.0016
Machinery -0.0003 -0.0006 Public Admin and Defense 0.0028 0.0051
Electrical and Optical Equipment -0.0002 -0.0014 Education 0.0012 0.0026
Transport Equipment -0.0022 -0.0013 Health and Social Work 0.0072 0.0137
Manufacturing, nec 0.0000 0.0002 Other Community and Social Services 0.0005 0.0013
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply -0.0004 0.0010 Private Households with Employed Persons 0.0002 0.0004
Construction -0.0038 -0.0111 sum 0.000 0.000
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Figure 2.7: Average Income and Income Elasticity of Production
Figure 2.7 plots the sectoral income elasticity computed from total expenditure and fi-
nal consumption against the exporter’s log average income. I find a positive relationship
which implies that high-income countries specialize in the production of high-income elastic
goods, which is consistent with previous findings in Hallak (2006), Khandelwal (2010), Hal-
lak and Schott (2011) and Feenstra and Romalis (2014). The null hypothesis that all income
elasticities are zero is rejected.
Figure 2.8 plots the sectoral income elasticity computed from total expenditure and final
consumption against the skill intensity of each sector. I find that skill-intensive sectors
produce goods that have a high income elasticity. This implies that a decline in the relative
price of low-income elastic goods from trade liberalization is correlated with a decline in the
relative price of goods in unskill-intensive sectors. This implication, along with the other
two mentioned in the last section, suggests that trade liberalization increases the nominal
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Figure 2.8: Skill Intensity and Sectoral Income Elasticity
Finally, to estimate ↵h
(j,n), I assume that it can be decomposed into an exporter e↵ect, an,





as before. I then estimate an from the sector-level non-homothetic gravity equation and aj+










h = aj+  ̄jyh+"hj .
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2.4 Counterfactuals
Recall that equation (14) can be used to compute the global welfare change of individual z
between trade and a counterfactual scenario:
19Alternatively, note that the aggregate expenditure share in equation (11) is a non-linear function in
↵h(j,n) and, {ph(j,h)}j2J 8h, the output prices in the general equilibrium, given the estimates of  j and  (j,n).
I use Sh(j,n) as an initial guess for ↵
h
(j,n) and solve for the prices. Given these prices, I solve for an updated




































(j,n) is the aggregate expenditure e↵ect, and it measures the reduction








tr) is the individual











). For individual z who is richer
than the representative consumer, a decrease in the relative price of low-income elastic goods




is the income e↵ect, and its change depends on the sector that
individual z works in. An increase in a sector’s output price raises the relative nominal
wage of the labor groups that disproportionately work in that sector in the initial trade
equilibrium.
2.4.1 Five Percent Reduction in Trade Costs
I first consider a simultaneous 5% reduction in all bilateral trade costs, starting from the
baseline parametrization.20 Since I am interested in the impact of trade liberalization on
di↵erent groups of people, in particular, the poor versus the rich, I focus on the di↵erence
in welfare change between the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile of the initial nominal
wage distribution within each country that comes from each of the components in equation
(14). Since the aggregate expenditure e↵ect is the same for every individual within a country,
it is di↵erenced out. I define the following terms: di↵. exp. e↵ect = ind. exp. e↵ectz=10th 
20Please see Appendix B.6 for a discussion about how to implement the counterfactual where each country
moves back to autarky.
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Active channel(s) Income Expenditure Both
di↵. exp. e↵ect 0 [0.43, 0.88] [0.76, 1.36]
di↵. inc. e↵ect [ 0.01, 0.04] 0 [ 0.72, 0.04]
di↵. tot. e↵ect [ 0.01, 0.04] [0.43, 0.88] [0.24, 1.29]
Table 2.4: Distributional E↵ects through Income Channel
ind. exp. e↵ectz=90th; di↵. inc. e↵ect = income e↵ectz=10th  income e↵ectz=90th; di↵.
tot. e↵ect = total e↵ectz=10th  total e↵ectz=90th.
2.4.1.1 Income Channel
I first study the distributional e↵ects of trade liberalization through the income channel.
The second column of Table 2.4 reports the lower and upper bounds of di↵. exp. e↵ect,
di↵. inc. e↵ect, di↵. tot. e↵ect across the 40 countries when only the income channel is
active. I shut down the expenditure channel by imposing that  
(j,n) = 08j 2 J, n 2 N . This
brings us back to a translog demand system which is homothetic. Under these restrictions,
the consumer price index for every individual within a country changes by the same amount,
i.e. di↵. exp. e↵ect=0.
I find that in Estonia, the 10th percentile su↵ers a decrease in the nominal wage relative
to the 90th percentile of 0.01 percentage points. On the other hand, in Portugal, the 10th
percentile enjoys an increase in the relative nominal wage by 0.04 percentage points. The
change in the relative nominal wage for the rest of the countries lies in between.
Panel A of Figure 2.9 plots di↵. inc. e↵ect against the log average income for each
country. Panel B plots a country’s skill abundance against its log average income.21 The
regression lines are based on the weighted least squares with weights equal to the output
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Figure 2.9: Distributional E↵ects through Income Channel
share of a country in the world economy. I find that the income channel benefits the poor
more than the rich in low-income countries that are skill-scarce. These countries have a
comparative advantage in unskill-intensive sectors and a reduction in trade costs increases
the relative nominal wage of the poor because they are less skilled and more likely to work
in unskill-intensive sectors. On the other hand, the income channel benefits the rich more
than the poor in high-income countries that are skill-abundant. These countries have a
comparative advantage in skill-intensive sectors and a reduction in trade costs increases the
relative nominal wage of the rich because they are more skilled and more likely to work in
skill-intensive sectors.
2.4.1.2 Expenditure Channel
I next study the distributional e↵ects of trade liberalization through the expenditure channel.
The third column of Table 2.4 reports the lower and upper bounds of di↵. exp. e↵ect, di↵.
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Active channel(s) Income Expenditure Both
di↵. exp. e↵ect 0 [0.43, 0.88] [0.76, 1.36]
di↵. inc. e↵ect [ 0.01, 0.04] 0 [ 0.72, 0.04]
di↵. tot. e↵ect [ 0.01, 0.04] [0.43, 0.88] [0.24, 1.29]
Table 2.4: Distributional E↵ects through Expenditure Channel
inc. e↵ect, di↵. tot. e↵ect across the 40 countries when only the expenditure channel is
active. I shut down the income channel by imposing that T ( , j) = 1 8  2 ⇤, j 2 J , that
is, there is no comparative advantage of di↵erent labor types across sectors. Under these
restrictions, the nominal wage of every individual within a country changes by the same
amount, i.e. di↵. inc. e↵ect=0.
I find that the expenditure channel benefits the poor more than the rich in every country.
More specifically, in Indonesia, the 10th percentile enjoys a reduction in the consumer price
index that is 0.43 percentage points bigger than the 90th percentile. On the other hand,
in Taiwan, the 10th percentile enjoys a reduction in the consumer price index that is 0.88
percentage points bigger than the 90th percentile. The poor’s relative benefit from the
expenditure channel for the rest of the countries lies in between.
Why does the expenditure channel imply a pro-poor bias in every country? The most




, the homothetic price ag-





, in every country h,
and therefore decreases the expenditure shares on goods with  
(j,n) < 0. This is an inward
shift in the demand for low-income elastic goods which decreases their relative price. Since
low-income consumers spend more on these goods, they benefit more from the expenditure
channel.
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Figure 2.10: Percentage Change in Prices
against its income elasticity,  
(j,n). Panel A uses the income elasticity computed from total
expenditure while Panel B restricts to final consumption. The correlation is strongly positive
regardless of which estimate of  
(j,n) I use, that is, there is a decrease in the relative price of
low-income elastic goods following trade liberalization.
Across countries, I find that expenditure channel benefits the poor relative to the rich
even more in high-income countries that import low-income elastic goods. Panel A of Figure
2.11 plots di↵. exp. e↵ect against the log average income for each country. Panel B
plots the income elasticity of a country’s imports relative to its production against its log
average income.22 The regression lines are based on the weighted least squares with weights
equal to the output share of a country in the world economy. Because high-income countries
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B: income elasticity of imports
Figure 2.11: Distributional E↵ects through Expenditure Channel
import low-income elastic goods, the decrease in the relative price of low-income elastic
goods is magnified by the lower trade costs, which implies a bigger relative benefit from the
expenditure channel for the poor.
2.4.1.3 Both Channels
Finally, I study the distributional e↵ects of trade liberalization through both channels. The
average gain from a simultaneous 5% reduction in all bilateral trade costs across the countries
is 1.2%. As I move up the income distribution, gains decline. More specifically, moving to
the next decile reduces gains by about 0.1 percentage points. The third column of Table 2.4
reports the lower and upper bounds of di↵. exp. e↵ect, di↵. inc. e↵ect, di↵. tot. e↵ect
across the 40 countries when both the expenditure channel and the income channel are active.
Since non-homothetic preferences allow people with di↵erent incomes to consume di↵erent
bundles of goods, price changes resulting from trade liberalization can have a di↵erential
44
Active channel(s) Income Expenditure Both
di↵. exp. e↵ect 0 [0.43, 0.88] [0.76, 1.36]
di↵. inc. e↵ect [ 0.01, 0.04] 0 [ 0.72, 0.04]
di↵. tot. e↵ect [ 0.01, 0.04] [0.43, 0.88] [0.24, 1.29]
Table 2.4: Distributional E↵ects through Both Channels
impact on an individual’s consumer price index. I find a pro-poor bias from the expenditure
channel in every country, i.e., di↵. exp. e↵ect>0. On average, the 10th percentile sees
her consumer price index decrease by 1 percentage point more than the 90th percentile.
In addition, since di↵erent labor groups sort into di↵erent sectors based on comparative
advantage, price changes resulting from trade liberalization can have a di↵erential impact
on an individual’s nominal wage. I find a pro-rich bias from the income channel in every
country, i.e., di↵. inc. e↵ect<0. On average, the 10th percentile sees her nominal wage
go down by 0.24 percentage points relative to the 90th percentile. Since the expenditure
e↵ect dominates the income e↵ect in magnitude, trade liberalization benefits the poor more
than the rich in every country, i.e., di↵. tot. e↵ect>0. I find that in Luxembourg, the
10th percentile enjoys an increase in the real wage relative to the 90th percentile of 0.24
percentage points. On the other hand, in Taiwan, the 10th percentile enjoys an increase
in the relative real wage of 1.29 percentage points. The poor’s relative benefit from both
channels in terms of real wages for the rest of the countries lies in between. On average, the
di↵erence between the 10th and the 90th percentiles is about 0.8 percentage points.
More interestingly, I find that when both channels are active, the poor enjoy an even
bigger relative reduction in consumer price indices in every country compared to the case
where only the expenditure channel operates, that is, the range of di↵. exp. e↵ect across
the 40 countries changes from [0.43, 0.88] to [0.76, 1.36]. In addition, the poor now su↵er a
45
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Figure 2.12: Interaction of the Two Channels
relative decrease in nominal wages in every country. Note that the range of di↵. inc. e↵ect
across the 40 countries changes from [ 0.01, 0.04] to [ 0.72, 0.04]. That is, the interaction
of the two channels quantitatively changes the prediction of the di↵erential impact of trade
liberazliation on the poor versus the rich through the expenditure channel and qualitatively
through the income channel.
To see the comparison visually, Figure 2.12 plots (using blue x) di↵. inc. e↵ect when
only the income channel is active against di↵. exp. e↵ect when only the expenditure
channel is active, and then plots (using red diamond) di↵. inc. e↵ect against di↵. exp.
e↵ect when both channels are active and interact. The interaction changes the estimates of
both e↵ects significantly. More specifically, each country moves to the right which implies
that the poor’s relative benefit from the expenditure channel is bigger. Also, each country
moves downward and di↵. inc. e↵ect<0 for all of them, which implies that the rich benefit
relative to the poor from the income channel in every country.
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Why does the expenditure channel imply a bigger pro-poor bias and the income channel
imply a pro-rich bias in every country? When both channels are active, lower trade costs
reduce the relative demand for and the relative price of low-income elastic goods as discussed
before. However, since the poor disproportionately produce unskill-intensive goods which
are low-income elastic, their relative nominal wage goes down in every country. This implies
that the income channel benefits the rich everywhere. This e↵ect is absent when only the
income channel is active because the income elasticity of every good is 0. On the other
hand, as the nominal wage inequality goes up, the relative demand for and the relative price
of low-income elastic goods fall even further, reducing the relative price index for the poor
in every country. This implies that the expenditure channel benefits the poor even more
compared to the case where only the expenditure channel is active. This e↵ect is absent in
that case because nominal wage inequality is constant.
How does the poor’s relative benefit from the combined e↵ect of trade liberalization vary
across countries? Figure 2.13 plots di↵. tot. e↵ect against the log average income for each
country. The regression line is based on the weighted least squares with weights equal to the
output share of a country in the world economy. Since the expenditure channel benefits more
the poor individuals in rich countries and the rich individuals in poor countries, while the
income channel benefits more the rich individuals in rich countries and the poor individuals
in poor countries, allowing both channels to operate no longer makes income per capita a
good predictor of the pro-poor bias of trade liberalization.23
23Since country characteristics are all correlated and pull in di↵erent directions, none in the data that I
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Figure 2.13: Distributional E↵ects through Both Channels
2.4.1.4 Bias from Considering Two Channels Separately
Table 2.5 reports the bias from considering the two channels separately for each country.
In the second column, I add up di↵. inc. e↵ect when only the income channel is active
and di↵. exp. e↵ect when only the expenditure channel is active, and then compare to
di↵. tot. e↵ect when both channels are active as reported in the third column. I find that
estimating the two e↵ects separately and adding them up generates a significant downward
bias in the prediction for the poor’s relative benefit from trade liberalization.
In particular, this underestimation is stronger in a country like Japan, which produces
high-income elastic goods, compared to a country like Mexico, which produces low-income
elastic goods. This pattern generalizes to the entire sample of 40 countries. Figure 2.14 plots
the di↵erence in the poor’s relative benefit from trade liberalization between estimating the




j  (j,h). Panel A uses the income elasticity computed from total expenditure while
Panel B is restricted to final consumption. The correlation is strongly positive regardless of
which estimate of  ̄hprod I use, that is, the interaction of the two channels benefits more the
countries that produce high-income elastic goods.24
Country Separate Combined Country Separate Combined
AUS 0.75 0.85 IRL 0.66 0.80
AUT 0.66 0.80 ITA 0.68 0.91
BEL 0.55 0.56 JPN 0.76 1.06
BGR 0.64 0.79 KOR 0.76 1.18
BRA 0.66 0.86 LTU 0.63 0.78
CAN 0.63 0.74 LUX 0.60 0.24
CHN 0.71 0.90 LVA 0.63 0.78
CYP 0.74 1.01 MEX 0.70 0.77
CZE 0.59 0.73 MLT 0.68 0.76
DEU 0.65 0.76 NLD 0.67 0.82
DNK 0.68 0.81 POL 0.60 0.72
ESP 0.75 1.08 PRT 0.73 1.05
EST 0.64 0.78 ROU 0.63 0.84
FIN 0.68 0.89 RUS 0.72 0.95
FRA 0.63 0.72 SVK 0.61 0.76
GBR 0.71 0.69 SVN 0.64 0.82
GRC 0.73 1.02 SWE 0.65 0.74
HUN 0.63 0.80 TUR 0.70 0.76
IDN 0.46 0.47 TWN 0.89 1.29
IND 0.57 0.57 USA 0.80 0.87
Table 2.5: Bias from Considering Two Channels Separately
24Luxembourg is an outlier. It is one of the smallest sovereign states in Europe and has the world’s
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Figure 2.14: Underprediction of Pro-poor Bias of Trade Liberalization
Intuitively, the interaction reallocates workers away from unskill-intensive sectors that
produce low-income elastic goods in every country because it decreases the relative price of
low-income elastic goods. However, this is already the case in the countries that specialize
in the production of high-income elastic goods without the interaction. Therefore, the inter-
action induces a smaller increase in worker reallocation away from unskill-intensive sectors
in these countries, which implies a bigger benefit for the poor who work in these sectors.
2.4.2 Rising Chinese Import Competition
Autor et al. (2013) analyze the e↵ect of rising Chinese import competition between 1990
and 2007 on U.S. local labor markets, and they find that it causes higher unemployment,
lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets that serve import-
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competing manufacturing industries.2526 They instrument for the growth in U.S. imports
from China using Chinese import growth in other high-income markets to isolate the foreign-
supply-driven component of the changes, i.e., China’s productivity growth and falling trade
costs. In particular, for their base specifications, they focus on a single channel through
which trade with China a↵ects a region: greater import competition in the U.S. market.
This ignores the e↵ects of greater U.S. exports to China or greater import competition in
the foreign markets that U.S. regions serve. Their main measure of local labor market
exposure to import competition is the change in Chinese import exposure per worker in
a region, where imports are apportioned to the region according to its share of national
industry employment. They also control for the start-of-period manufacturing share within
commuting zones so as to focus on variation in exposure to Chinese imports stemming from
di↵erences in industry mix within local manufacturing sectors.
Instead of using the variation across local labor markets, I analyze the aggregate ef-
fect of a $1K increase in U.S. manufacturing imports from China per worker.27 At initial





us = 0.0187 ⇤ 22.4128 = 0.42.28 To increase it by $1K is equivalent to an
increase in the total expenditure share on these goods of 4.46%.29 I shut down the e↵ects
of greater U.S. exports to China or greater import competition in the foreign markets that
25Wage changes in Autor et al. (2013) are in nominal and not real terms.
26It would be interesting and important to introduce unemployment or search into my framework. There
would then be consequences about adjustment to trade shocks in the short- and medium-run. I leave it for
future work. Please refer to Joan Monras’ and Matthieu Bellon’s work on these topics.
271 unit in my framework is approximately $1000.
28Sectors “Agriculture” and “Food, Beverages and Tobacco” are the food sectors; “Mining” and from
“Textiles” to “Manufacturing, nec” in the first column in Table 2 and 3 are the manufacturing sectors. The










us = 0.0446. Note that this increase in spending
on Chinese goods that Autor et al. (2013) consider is due to supply and trade-cost-driven changes in China’s
export performance, not changes in U.S. import demand as a result of higher income.
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the U.S. serves by holding the production prices, p
(j,h) 8j 2 J, 8h 6= US, and trade costs,
⌧n
(j,h) 8j 2 J, 8h 6= CHN, 8n 6= US, unchanged. To compute the reduction in trade costs in
the manufacturing sectors that would lead to this increase in Chinese imports, I apply the











(j,chn) ·d⌧ if j 2 M .30 Plugging in the estimates of  j, I have log(d⌧) =  0.8.
Applying equation (32) again, I calculate the impact of this reduction in trade costs on U.S.




log(d⌧). I then solve for U.S. production
prices again, pus
(j,us) 8j 2 J , such that the U.S. market clearing conditions (equation (26)) are
still satisfied, taking into account the change in domestic demand.
I find that production prices, pus
(j,us), go down in all j 2 J in the U.S. as a result of
rising Chinse import competition. They decrease in the manufacturing sectors because
of the lower demand for the domestically produced goods, and in the non-manufacturing
sectors because workers choose to leave manufacturing and work in other sectors in response
to lower output prices and wages in manufacturing. This increases the labor supply in
the non-manufacturing sectors, putting downward pressure on the output prices in these
sectors. The aggregate expenditure e↵ect,
Euscf
Eustr
, is 0.85%, that is, the reduction in the cost of
Chinese manufacturing imports decreases the consumer price index for a U.S. representative







, implies a pro-
poor bias of 0.45 percentage points, with individuals whose wages are at the 10th percentile of
30Note that I attribute this increase in Chinese imports entirely to the reduction in trade costs for
simplification. Suppose it is due to China’s improved productivity instead, then its production prices would
decrease. Both of these forces have the same e↵ect on US consumer prices, each of which is the product
of the production price and the trade cost. Note also that the change in these trade costs also a↵ects yus
through its impact on a(pus). I ignore it since this e↵ect is negligibly small and does not change the result
of the analysis.
310.75% of this decrease stems from the lower consumer prices of Chinese imports in the U.S. and the
remaining 0.1% comes from the lower production prices of U.S. goods.
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the initial distribution see a further 0.35 percentage points reduction in their consumer price
indices compared to the representative consumer and individuals whose wages are at the 90th
percentile see their consumer price indices decrease by 0.1 percentage points less than the
representative consumer. This result comes from the fact that Chinese manufacturing goods
are low-income elastic and, consequently, their lower prices benefit more the poor individuals





, implies a pro-rich
bias of 0.02 percentage points, while poor and unskilled workers see their nominal wages
go down by 0.13% and rich and skilled workers see their nominal wages go down by 0.11%.
The reason that the former see a bigger decline in their nominal wages is because they are
more likely to work in manufacturing sectors that are in direct competition with cheaper
Chinese imports. The more pronounced decrease in the output prices in these sectors leads
to the bigger decrease in their nominal wages. Combining all three e↵ects, poor individuals
gain 0.43 percentage points more compared to rich ones in terms of real wage as a result
of the rising Chinese import competition. That is, the pro-rich bias of the income e↵ect is
more than o↵set by the pro-poor bias of the expenditure e↵ect which again underlines the
importance of taking both channels into account in assessing the distributional e↵ects of
trade liberalization.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the following question: what is the impact of trade liberalization on
the distribution of real wages in a large cross-section of countries? The vast majority of the
literature focuses on the e↵ect of trade on the distribution of nominal wages. A small number
3211 out of China’s 14 manufacturing sectors have  (j,chn) < 0.
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of studies consider its di↵erential impact on consumer price indices. To my knowledge, there
are only three case studies that have combined both channels to examine how real wages of
di↵erent groups of people are a↵ected in individual countries, Argentina, Mexico and India.
I use sector-level trade and production data to estimate the parameters of the model in
Chapter 1. I find that as a result of a five percent reduction in all bilateral trade costs, the
bigger decline in the poor’s consumer price indices more than compensates for their lower
relative nominal wage. More specifically, in the average country, real wage of the bottom 10th
percentile increases by 0.8 percentage points more than the top 10th percentile. I also find
that there is an important interaction between the two channels and, therefore, estimating
the two e↵ects separately and adding them up leads to a significant bias. These results
highlight the importance of combining both channels in order to measure the distributional
e↵ects of trade accurately.
My findings have important policy implications for the distribution of winners and losers
from trade reforms. There has been increasing public resistance to freer trade that originates
from the belief that the most vulnerable group, i.e., the poor and unskilled, will be hurt the
most. This chapter demonstrates that such a belief is misguided.
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Chapter 3
Imported Inputs and Within-Sector
Wage Dispersion
Mi Dai, Zheli He and Feiran Zhang
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3.1 Introduction
The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that countries export goods that use in-
tensively the factor they are most abundantly endowed with. According to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, trade increases the relative return to unskilled labor in developing coun-
tries, decreasing wage inequality. However, that prediction is at odds with many empirical
findings. Take China as an example, the overall wage inequality, measured as the di↵erence
between the 90th and the 10th percentile of the log wage distribution, has been going up
consistently in the last two decades, as found in Han et al. (2012). This period of rapid wage
inequality increase coincided with China’s implementation of dramatic economic reforms and
an open door policy that promoted its trade with the rest of the world. So two important
questions arise: did trade liberalization contribute to China’s rising wage inequality? If so,
through which channels?
New theoretical developments have been made to provide insights into the e↵ects of trade
on wage inequality. Most prominently, Verhoogen (2008) proposes the quality-upgrading
mechanism as an explanation. In his model with heterogeneous plants and quality di↵er-
entiation, an exchange-rate devaluation leads more productive Southern plants to increase
exports, upgrade quality, and raise wages relative to less productive ones, increasing within-
sector wage dispersion. In this chapter, we propose an alternative mechanism: the use of
imported inputs. Intuitively, a firm with higher initial productivity is better at using higher
quality foreign inputs. This justifies paying the fixed cost for a larger set of imported inputs
when input tari↵ liberalization decreases their relative price. The firm becomes more import
intensive, which enchances its productivity advantage. As a result, the firm hires higher
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quality workers, produces higher quality products and pays higher wages to its workers, in-
creasing within-sector wage dispersion. We aim to empirically distinguish these mechanisms
in the data, as they each have di↵erent welfare and policy implications.
First, we use ASIF (Annual Survey of Industrial Firms) from China’s National Bureau
of Statistics that report key operational data on Chinese manufacturing firms to document
some stylized facts that are both new and interesting. We find that both the mean and
the dispersion of the distribution of firm productivity, markup and size went up during a
period when China reduced its tari↵s on imported inputs. More importantly, these results
still hold when we consider the subset of firms that survived throughout the sample period,
from 1998 to 2007. Therefore, openness to trade has fundamental e↵ects on the underlying
characteristics of firms. Most of recent models of firm heterogeneity assume that these
characteristics are fixed and examine the impact of trade on aggregate variables, for example,
the average productivity of firms in the economy as a result of change in the composition of
surviving firms. On the contrary, we study the di↵erential impact of trade liberalization on
heterogeneous firms allowing these characteristics to be endogenous.
We measure firm-level TFP based on OLS, Olley and Pakes, Levinsohn and Petrin, and
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer to ensure that our estimate of firm productivity is as accurate
as possible. For firm-level markup calculation, we adopt De Loecker and Warzynski (2012),
which is the best available method that we can use given our data limitaitons. We consider
both a Cobb-Douglas gross output production function, and more generally, a translog gross
output production function, which matches the data much better. Finally, we measure
firm size both in terms of output value and total employment as a robustness check. The
empirical patterns are very similar when we use di↵erent approaches to measure these three
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key firm-level variables.
Second, we develop a partial equilibrium, heterogeneous firm model with endogenous
imported inputs and labor quality choice that is consistent with these observations. On the
demand side, we adopt the “quality-Melitz” model in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), where
higher price decreases demand but higher quality increases demand. On the supply side,
firms di↵er from each other in the usual dimension of productivity, as in Melitz (2003). In
our model, firms combine labor and intermediate inputs to produce physical quantity, in
the spirit of Amiti et al. (2014). Output quality, on the other hand, is determined by labor
and input qualities, and the advantage of imported inputs over domestic counterparts is
augmented by a firm’s own productivity. Since Amiti et al. (2014) focus on exchange rate
pass-through, and assume that firms do not foresee fluctuations in exchange rates, they hold
the set of imported inputs of each firm fixed. We, on the other hand, study precisely how
firms adjust the set of foreign varieties they import in response to input tari↵ liberalization
and changes in firm-level variables that follow. Consequently, our model deviates from theirs
in obvious ways, which we explain in more detail in the theory section.
Finally, we use Chinese Customs Data on imports and exports, which provide detailed in-
formation on the universe of China’s firm-level trade transactions for the years 2000 to 2006,
to highlight firms’ di↵erent responses to a dramatic decrease in import tari↵s. These obser-
vations emphasize the large and growing importance of trade in intermediates, and provide
some empirical evidence that supports our hypothesis that the di↵erential change in import
intensity of firms with di↵erent productivity levels in response to input tari↵ liberalization
explains the increase in both the average and the dispersion of firm-level variables that are
observed in the data.
58
Although the main focus of this chapter is to show that input tari↵ liberalization af-
fects firms at di↵erent levels of productivity in a heterogeneous way, which drives their
performance further apart, our results have broader implications. Essentially, we provide
a framework in which the di↵erential impact of any element of globalization that leads to
a decrease in the marginal cost of production on firm-level characteristics can be analyzed.
Our detailed and very disaggregated transaction-level trade data allow us to quantify the
impact of such a change during a period when the change was very large in magnitude.
3.2 Related Literature
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. First, there have been studies on
the labor market e↵ects of international trade based on recent models of firm heterogeneity,
and they ask how trade liberalization a↵ects wages and wage inequality. For example, Amiti
and Davis (2012) develop a model, which predicts that a fall in output tari↵s lowers wages
at import-competing firms but boosts wages at exporting firms, and that a fall in input
tari↵s raises wages at import-using firms relative to those that only source inputs locally.
They find support for the model’s predictions in Indonesian manufacturing census data for
the period 1991-2000. Like us, they take explicit account of firm-level heterogeneity and
importance of trade in intermediates. Extending the heterogeneous firm model of trade and
inequality from Helpman et al. (2010), Helpman et al. (2017) show that much of overall
wage inequality arises within sector-occupations and for workers with similar observable
characteristics, and wage dispersion between firms is related to firm employment size and
trade participation. They again emphasize the importance of employing recent models of
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firm heterogeneity in analyzing the contribution of trade to the cross-section dispersion of
firms. Fŕıas et al. (2012), on the other hand, o↵er some empirical evidence that sorting
on individual worker ability is not enough to explain the relationship between exporting
and wages at the plant level. They use a combination of employer-employee and plant-level
data from Mexico, and show that approximately two-thirds of the higher level of wages in
larger, more productive plants is explained by higher levels of wage premia, and that nearly
all of the di↵erential within-industry wage change is explained by changes in wage premia.
They use the late-1994 Mexican peso devaluation as a source of exogenous variation in the
incentive to export, while we use import tari↵ reductions due to China’s accession to the
WTO in December 2001 as our exogenous variation. On the contrary, Krishna et al. (2012)
find an insignificant di↵erential e↵ect of trade openness on wages at exporting firms relative
to domestic firms, using detailed information on worker and firm characteristics to control
for compositional e↵ects and allowing for the endogenous assignment of workers to firms.
While these papers focus on the e↵ects of trade liberalization on the labor market, we look at
other firm-level characteristics, and ask how they are a↵ected, and the resulting implications
on wage inequality in China.
Second, our theoretical model borrows insights from a burgeoning research literature on
firm import behavior, which has not been extensively studied before. Most importantly,
evidence has been found in a wide range of countries that firm productivity rises when a
firm imports new input varieties. For example, Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) conclude
that becoming an importer of foreign intermediates improves productivity using plant-level
Chilean manufacturing panel data. At the same time, Halpern et al. (2015) find that im-
porting all foreign varieties would increase firm productivity by 12 percent, and that during
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1993-2002, one-third of the productivity growth in Hungary was due to imported inputs by
estimating a model of importers in Hungarian micro data and conducting counterfactual pol-
icy analysis. Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2014), on the other hand, use a firm-level database of
imports provided by French Customs for the 1995-2005 period, and find a significant impact
of higher diversification and increased number of imported input varieties on firm-level TFP
and export scope. They argue that importing more varieties of intermediate inputs increases
firm productivity and thereby makes a firm more able to overcome the fixed export costs.
Our model predicts that a firm with higher initial productivity has a stronger incentive to
expand its set of imported varieties when it faces lower tari↵ rates, which then makes it even
more productive, explaining the empirical patterns observed in the data.
Third, we want to point out that these findings cannot be explained by any previous
studies on heterogeneous firms. We discuss briefly a few important papers on the subject.
To start with, the workhorse model developed in Melitz (2003) assumes that the preferences
of a representative consumer are given by a C.E.S. utility function over a continuum of goods,
so each firm chooses the same profit maximizing markup which is constant. After paying
fixed entry costs, firms draw their initial productivity parameter, which does not change
over time. As a result, the mean and the dispersion of the productivity distribution of a
balanced panel of firms remain the same, which is not what we observe in the data. Gains
from trade in this model come from expansion in product varieties, and more importantly,
the self-selection of more e cient firms into exporting. Relaxing the C.E.S. assumption,
Arkolakis et al. (2015) study how variable markups a↵ect the gains from trade liberalization
under monopolistic competition, and they show that the welfare e↵ect of a small trade shock
is given by @lnW =  (1   ⌘)@ln 
✏
, where   is the share of expenditure on domestic goods,
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and ✏ is an elasticity of imports with respect to variable trade costs, and ⌘ is a structural
parameter that depends, among other things, on the elasticity of markups with respect to
firm production. Although they consider variable markups like us, they assume that firm-
level productivity is the realization of a random variable drawn independently across firms
from a distribution, which is unbounded Pareto, and it is fixed over time. Instead of a
counterfactual analysis that focuses on the welfare e↵ect of a particular shock, Feenstra and
Weinstein (2010) use a translog demand system to measure the e↵ects of new varieties and
variable markups on the change in the U.S. consumer price index between 1992 and 2005.
That is, they use observed trade data to infer changes in particular components of the U.S.
price index. Their results highlight the importance of taking into account the implications
of pro-competitive e↵ect of trade. However, they ignore the impact of trade on productivity
since that is not the main focus of their paper. On the other hand, Feenstra (2014) shows that
self-selection of more e cient firms into exporting is the only source of welfare gains when
using a Pareto distribution for productivity with a support that is unbounded above. He
restores a role for product variety and pro-competitive gains from trade, but still assumes
that firms receive a random draw of productivity from a Pareto distribution, which does
not change. Finally, borrowing insights from Melitz (2003) that trade openness increases
volatility by making the economy more granular since only the largest and most productive
firms export, while smaller firms shrink or disapper, Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) show
that when the distribution of firm sizes follows a power law with an exponent close to -1, the
idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on aggregate output volatility. In their
model, these firm-level idiosyncratic shocks may explain the observed increase in dispersion
of firm size distribution, but they do not provide a microfoundation to explain why both the
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mean and the standard deviation of the distribution go up in a systematic way since they
assume i.i.d. transitory shock. Essentially, these theoretical papers consider the e↵ect of a
change in the exogenous distribution of firm productivity, while we take firm productivity
as an endogenous variable. Therefore, we are able to add something new and interesting to
the conversation about the impact of trade based on recent models of firm heterogeneity.
3.3 Data
The first dataset, Chinese Customs Data on imports and exports, provides detailed informa-
tion on the universe of China’s firm-level trade transactions for the years 2000 to 2006. In
addition to firm identifiers, this dataset includes information on many important transaction
characteristics, including customs regime (e.g. processing trade or ordinary trade), 8-digit
HS product code, transaction value, quantity, and source or destination country. Using firm
identifiers provided in the dataset, we construct key variables that describe firm-level im-
ports and exports. Figure 3.1 illustrates the customs declaration form that a firm has to fill
out if it intends to import from or export to foreign countries.
The second key dataset is from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, which conducts
firm-level surveys on manufacturing enterprises. These data collected from Chinese firms
include key operational information, such as firm employment, ownership type (e.g. state-
owned enterprise, foreign invested firm, or private firm), sales value, R&D expenditure and
industry. Merging the firm-level data with the transaction-level data is challenging because
firm identifiers used in the two datasets are di↵erent. Nevertheless, since both datasets
include extensively detailed firm contact information (e.g. company name, telephone number,
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Figure 3.1: Customs Declaration Form
zip code, contact person), we merge them using zip codes and the last seven digits of a
firm’s phone number, following Yu (2015). In this way, we are able to generate firm-level
observations that combine information on the trade with the operational activities of Chinese
firms. Table 3.1 compares some of the main characteristics of merged and unmerged firms,
and they look very similar on average in terms of employment, sales, value added per worker
and TFP, mitigating our concern about sample selection bias.













Table 3.1: Comparison of Merged with Unmerged Firms in the Data
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3.4 Stylized Facts
To motivate our theoretical model, we first present some stylized facts about the change in
firm-level productivity, markup and size during a period of large scale trade liberalization.
We focus on a balanced panel, that is, the set of manufacturing firms that survived the entire
sample period, from 2000 to 2006, since we are interested in the within-firm change due to
open trade. Unlike most previous literature that only looks at how these variables change
on average, we also consider the change in dispersion, and argue that the sample mean is no
longer su cient to explain the impact of trade liberalization on firm performance and the
resulted wage inequality within a country. We find that both the mean and the standard
deviation of these three variables go up during this period.
3.4.1 Productivity
We measure firm-level TFP based on a few di↵erent approaches. Besides simple OLS, we
first use Olley and Pakes (OP), a method for robust estimation of the production function
allowing for endogeneity of the inputs, selection and unobserved permanent di↵erences across
firms. Essentially, they use investment to proxy for firm productivity shock in the first stage,
and then use semi-parametric selection correction to correct for endogenous exit. We extend
the traditional OP procedure by including an exporter dummy, following Amiti and Konings
(2007). Second, we use Levinsohn and Petrin (LP), which instead of investment, use material
expenditures as proxy for productivity shock, since investment is zero for many firms. Finally,
we adopt Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer, a GMM procedure using orthogonality of lagged labor
and productivity shock. They argue that labor and investment in OP, or labor and material
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expenditures in LP are likely to be collinear. All of these approaches give us very similar
measures of TFP, so we report only the results based on OP and LP. However, we want to
point out that these TFP measures are still subject to the usual criticism, that is, they are
a residual that lumps together many things: technical e ciency, markups, input and output
quality and measurement error. We do not address these issues directly here since that is
not the focus of this chapter. With better data, on the other hand, a more robust measure
of firm-level TFP is possible.1 Note that there is an increase in both the mean and the
dispersion of firm-level productivity.
Specification Average TFP (Standard Deviation) Median TFP
LP 3.68 (1.09) 3.7
OP 4.61 (1.02) 4.59
Table 3.2: Productivity, 1999-2007 Pooled
Specification Average TFP (Standard Deviation) Median TFP
LP 3.32 (1.03) 3.37
OP 4.16 (0.92) 4.18
Table 3.3: Productivity, 1999
Specification Average TFP (Standard Deviation) Median TFP
LP 4.00 (1.18) 4.03
OP 5.08 (1.09) 5.09
Table 3.4: Productivity, 2007
1See De Loecker (2013).
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Panel A: Levinsohn-Petrin Panel B: Olley-Pakes
Figure 3.2: Balanced Panel TFP Estimation
3.4.2 Markup
To estimate firm-level markups, we adopt the method in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
Their approach relies on cost-minimizing producers and the existence of at least one variable
input of production. This empirical framework relies on the estimation of a production func-
tion and provides estimates of plant-level markups without specifying how firms compete
in the product market. There are several advantages in using their method. First, their
markup estimates are obtained using standard production data where output, total expen-
ditures on variable inputs, and revenue at the plant level are observed. Second, and more
importantly, we are able to relax a few key assumptions maintained in previous empirical
work. For example, we do not need to impose constant returns to scale, or to observe and
measure the user cost of capital.
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Below is a brief summary of their empirical model. Suppose a firm i at time t produces





it , Kit,!it) (3.1)
Assuming that producers active in the market are cost minimizing, we can therefore consider
the associated Lagrangian function:
L(X1it, ..., X
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where PX
v
it and rit denote a firm’s input price for a variable input v and capital, respectively.













Rearranging terms and multiplying both sides by Xit
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Define the markup, µit, as µit =
Pit
 it





where the output elasticity w.r.t an input X is denoted by ✓Xit . As a result, we obtain an








where ↵Xit is the share of expenditures on input Xit in total sales, PitQit.
Empirically, we consider two variations of the production function, a Cobb-Douglas gross
output production function and a translog gross output production function. In the second
case, the production function we take to the data, and estimate for each industry separately,
is given by:






it +  lmlitmit +  lklitkit +  mkmitkit
+ mklmitkitlit + !it + ✏it (3.7)
where ✏it are unanticipated shocks to production and i.i.d. shocks including measurement
error.
We follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and rely on material demand,
mit = mt(kit,!it, zit) (3.8)
to proxy for productivity by inverting mt(.), where we collect additional variables potentially
a↵ecting optimal input demand choice in the vector Zit. We include a firm’s export status,
for instance, in the control function.
In the first stage, we run:
yit =  t(lit, kit,mit, zit) + ✏it (3.9)
where we obtain estimates of expected output (c it) and ✏it. Expected output is given by:
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it +  lmlitmit +  lklitkit +  mkmitkit
+ mklmitkitlit + ht(mit, kit, zit) (3.10)
The second stage provides estimates for all production function coe cients by relying on the
law of motion for productivity:
!it = gt(!it 1) + ⇣it (3.11)
After the first stage, we can compute productivity for any value of  , where
  = ( l,  k,  m,  ll,  kk,  mm,  lm,  lk,  mk,  mkl)
using !it( ) =  ̂it    llit    mmit    kkit    lll2it    mmm2it    kkk2it    lmlitmit    lklitkit  
 mkmitkit    mklmitkitlit.
By nonparametrically regressing !it( ) on its lag, !it 1( ), we recover the innovation to
productivity given  , ⇣it( ).



























































































We apply the standard GMM techniques and rely on block bootstrapping for the standard
errors.
Output elasticities are computed using the estimated coe cients of the production func-
tion. For instance, output elasticity for material is given by:
✓̂Mit =  m + 2 mmit +  lmlit +  mkkit +  mklkitlit (3.13)
As mentioned above, we do not observe the correct expenditure share for material, mit,
directly since we only observe Q̃it, which is given by Qitexp(✏it). The first stage of our









We obtain an estimate of markup for each firm i at each point in time t using (3.6) as
µit = ✓̂Mit (↵̂
M
it )
 1, while allowing for considerable flexibility in the production function, con-
sumer demand, and competition. The estimation procedure is essentially the same when we
consider a Cobb-Douglas gross output production function. We simply drop higher-order
and interaction terms. We assume labor to be either a fully flexible input, that is, a control
variable correlated with contemporaneous productivity shock, where we use lagged labor as
instrument, or a predetermined variable, that is, a state variable, independent of contem-
poraneous shock, when we take into account hiring and firing costs, and we use itself as an
instrument.
Specification Average Markup (Standard Deviation) Median Markup
CD (L as control variable) 1.19 (0.27) 1.24
CD (L as state variable) 1.25 (0.23) 1.27
TL (L as control variable) 1.21 (0.13) 1.18
Table 3.5: Markup, 1999-2007 Pooled
Specification Average Markup (Standard Deviation) Median Markup
CD (L as control variable) 1.16 (0.26) 1.20
CD (L as state variable) 1.22 (0.22) 1.23
TL (L as control variable) 1.13 (0.09) 1.11
Table 3.6: Markup, 1999
Specification Average Markup (Standard Deviation) Median Markup
CD (L as control variable) 1.25 (0.30) 1.29
CD (L as state variable) 1.31 (0.26) 1.32
TL (L as control variable) 1.30 (0.16) 1.28
Table 3.7: Markup, 2007
We get quite similar estimates of markups across di↵erent specifications. When we com-
pare markups across the years, especially at the beginning and at the end of our sample
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period, it becomes clear that there is a substantial increase in both the mean and the dis-
persion of the distribution of markups, most evident in the case of a translog gross value
production function.
1999-2007 1999 vs. 2007
Figure 3.3: Balanced Panel Markup Estimation I
1999 vs. 2007 1999 vs. 2007
Figure 3.4: Balanced Panel Markup Estimation II
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3.4.3 Firm Size
We measure firm size in terms of log output value, both in nominal terms and deflated by
4-digit industry output deflator, and in terms of log employment. Its change follows the
same pattern as firm productivity and markups, that is, both the mean and the dispersion
of its distribution go up.
Specification Mean (Standard Deviation) Median
Log (nominal output value) 10.62 (1.35) 10.45
Log (deflated output value) 10.64 (1.34) 10.47
Log (employment) 5.41 (1.12) 5.32
Table 3.8: Firm Size, 1999-2007 Pooled
Specification Mean (Standard Deviation) Median
Log (nominal output value) 10.18 (1.22) 10
Log (deflated output value) 10.21 (1.22) 10.03
Log (employment) 5.36 (1.13) 5.26
Table 3.9: Firm Size, 1999
Specification Mean (Standard Deviation) Median
Log (nominal output value) 11.04 (1.49) 10.91
Log (deflated output value) 11 (1.48) 10.87
Log (employment) 5.4 (1.15) 5.3
Table 3.10: Firm Size, 2007
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Log nominal output value Log deflated output value
Figure 3.5: Balanced Panel Firm Size Estimation
3.5 Tari↵ Reductions and Imported Inputs
Since China joined the WTO in December 2001, it lowered its average tari↵ significantly,
from 16% to a little above 12% within one year from 2001 to 2002, and the average tari↵
kept declining steadily over the entire sample period. The last year in our sample, 2006,
saw an average tari↵ rate of only about 10%. It is indeed one of the most dramatic trade
liberalization episodes in China’s history. As a commitment to its WTO accession, China
also agreed to eliminate all quotas, licenses, tendering requirements and other non-tari↵
barriers to imports of manufactured goods by 2005.
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Source: Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) and WTO tari↵ database
Figure 3.6: Average Tari↵ at HS-8 Level
To motivate our theoretical model, we look at how heterogeneous firms at di↵erent pro-
ductivity levels adjust their set of imported varieties during this period of dramatic input
tari↵ liberalization. We find in the data that firms that belong to a higher quartile of the
productivity distribution expanded the number of foreign varieties that they imported by
more. This observation leads to an important feature of our model, which we explain in the
theory section.
We also see in the data that firms on average increased the number of their imported
products and source countries significantly between 2001 and 2002, when they experienced
the biggest tari↵ reductions. They kept expanding their imported varieties (product-country
pairs) until 2004, which then tapered o↵. Firms typically import a large number of products
from a number of countries, and therefore, we assume that firms can import a continuum of











Q1 3.95 Q1 5.35
Q2 4.21 Q2 5.42
Q3 4.48 Q3 6.75










Q1 5.21 Q1 4.77
Q2 6.38 Q2 5.84
Q3 7.78 Q3 7.49










Q1 4.27 Q1 3.62
Q2 5.61 Q2 5.14
Q3 7.08 Q3 6.81
Q4 12.24 Q4 11.21







Mean 158 16 278 Mean 181 18 331







Mean 183 19 348 Mean 188 19 370







Mean 179 19 363 Mean 157 19 327
Median 102 15 146 Median 90 15 137
Table 3.12: Number of Imported Products, Source Countries and Varieties
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3.6 Model
In this section, we present a partial equilibrium, heterogeneous firm model with endogenous
imported input and labor quality choice to account for the aforementioned empirical findings.
On the demand side, we adopt the “quality-Melitz” model in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012),
where higher price decreases demand but higher quality increases demand. On the supply
side, firms di↵er from each other in the usual dimension of productivity, as in Melitz (2003).
In our model, firms combine labor and intermediate inputs to produce physical quantity,
in the spirit of Amiti et al. (2014). Output quality, on the other hand, is determined by
labor and input quality, and the advantage of imported inputs over domestic counterparts
is augmented by a firm’s own productivity.
3.6.1 Demand
Similar to Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), a representative consumer has the following constant-












where I denotes the set of all di↵erentiated varieties available; i 2 I indexes a particular
variety;   > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between di↵erent varieties; yi is the
quantity of variety i consumed; qi is the output quality of variety i, chosen by the firm
producing variety i and assumed to be observable to all.
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Consumer optimization yields the following demand function for variety i:




where pi is the price of variety i charged by the firm; Y = U =
h
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quality-adjusted ideal price index. This demand function is increasing in the quality and
decreasing in the price.
3.6.2 Production
There is a continuum of firms of measure |I|, each producing one di↵erentiated variety.
Without any ambiguity, we also use i to index the firm producing variety i. Firms di↵er
from each other in their productivity, 'i, drawn from a known distribution upon entering
the market and are thereafter fixed, as in Melitz (2003).2
Let us consider a particular firm i. Its production can be summarized by two produc-
tion functions - one characterizing the production of physical quantity, yi, and the other
characterizing the production of output quality, qi. The production of physical quantity is






2Here we assume the support of the distribution is bounded below by 1. This assumption is made mainly
to eliminate scenarios in which low productivity firms make high quality foreign inputs less e cient than







 j log (Xij) dj
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(3.18)
Xij = Zij + '
b
iajMij (3.19)
Li is the amount of labor used. 0 < 1     < 1 is the labor share of variable costs. Xi
is the intermediate input aggregated from a continuum of inputs of measure 1, indexed by





Xij is the amount of input j used. For each input j, there are both domestic and foreign
varieties denoted by Zij and Mij respectively, which are perfect substitutes. The foreign
variety has a natural advantage, aj > 1, over its domestic counterpart. However, the actual
advantage, 'biaj, is the natural advantage augmented by a firm’s productivity, implying
that more productive firms are able to use the same foreign input more e ciently than less
productive ones. b > 0, is a parameter that governs the di↵erential e ciency of foreign
input use between firms at di↵erent levels of productivity - the larger b is, the greater the
di↵erential e ciency.
The production of output quality is summarized by a constant-returns-to-scale supermod-
ular function in labor quality and intermediate input quality:
qi =






















1 j 2 JZi
'biaj j 2 JMi
(3.21)
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c is the labor quality chosen by the firm;3 bj is the quality of intermediate input j; JZi
represents the set of inputs for which domestic varieties are used, and JMi = [0, 1] \JZi
represents the set of inputs for which foreign varieties are imported; ✓ < 0 captures the
constant degree of complementarity between labor quality and intermediate input quality.
A more negative ✓ represents a stronger complementarity. With this specification, firms
using higher quality foreign inputs also have a greater incentive to use higher quality labor
to complement them.
We assume there is only domestic labor market, given the low international mobility
of labor relative to capital and intermediate inputs. Workers, l, are ex-ante homogeneous
with wages normalized to 1. There exists a sector that transforms homogeneous labor into
di↵erent quality, with the production function: F (l, c) = l
c
. This implies that the marginal
cost of producing one unit of labor with quality c is c · 1 = c. Labor market is assumed to
be perfectly competitive, hence the price of labor of quality c is pL (c) = c.
For intermediate input j, there are domestic market and foreign market. Firms are price
takers in both. The equilibrium prices of domestic variety and foreign variety are pZj and
pMj respectively.
4 However, on top of the price, pMj , there are variable trade costs, ⌧j   1, in
the form of iceberg costs. In other words, for a firm to acquire one unit of foreign variety of
input j, it has to pay for ⌧j units at the costs of ⌧jpMj .
We assume that there are no fixed costs of importing at each input level.5 However, each
3Labor quality, c, is a continuous variable with positive support. It is perfectly observable to firms, so
we abstract from any asymmetric information problems.
4Both are expressed in terms of a home currency. Exchange rates are not the focus of this chapter.
5This is mainly to avoid the problem of multiple equilibria. Amiti et al. (2014) have fixed costs of
importing at each input level. But they fix the set of imported inputs before the choice of output in
equilibrium, because the exchange rate shocks in their paper are assumed to be unforeseen. In this chapter,
however, we wish to allow both output and the set of imported inputs to respond to a change in the variable
trade costs. The addition of fixed costs of importing at each input level will thus introduce multiple equilibria.
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firm has to pay fixed import costs, fM , if it switches from not importing at all to importing
some inputs. There are also fixed costs of production, f , each period.
3.6.3 Equilibrium
In order to solve the firm’s profit maximization problem, we follow the strategy in Amiti
et al. (2014). We break down the problem into two stages. In the first stage, we hold the
set of imported inputs, JMi , fixed and solve the optimization problem conditional on J
M
i . In
the second stage, we allow JMi to vary so that we can pin down the optimal set of imported
inputs, JM⇤i .
3.6.3.1 Stage 1: Profit Maximization Conditional on a Fixed Set of Imported
Inputs
In this stage, we fix the set of imported inputs, JMi 6= ;.6 Then the firm’s profits can be
written as:





































dj   fM   f (3.22)








i , using the demand
function and pL (c) = c, into the first equality.
6We restrict attention to firms that import. The determination of the cuto↵, '
nm
, below which firms
never import is discussed in the next section, by comparing the firm’s profits given its optimal set of imported
inputs with those when it does not import any inputs.
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 fM   f (3.23)





































Let the Lagrange multipliers associated with (3.24), (3.25) and (3.26) be  , ,  respectively.






















i =   (3.28)
Li =   (1   ) q1 ✓i c✓ 1 (3.29)







pZj =  Xi
 j
Zij
, 8j 2 JZi (3.32)
⌧jp
M
j =  Xi
 j
Mij
, 8j 2 JMi (3.33)
We can solve for the optimal labor quality, output quality, output quantity and profits,
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conditional on JMi , as follows:

































(1   )(1  )(  1)   (  1)Y P   · '  1i · (qiBi)
 (  1)
 fM   f (3.36)



















The first equation postulates that, conditional on the same set of imported inputs, firms
with higher productivity can make more out of foreign inputs and thus hire higher quality
labor to complement them, ultimately producing higher quality outputs. Conditional on
the same productivity, firms that import a larger set of inputs also hire higher quality labor
due to the increase in the quality of intermediate inputs, and also produce higher quality
outputs. As a result, these firms pay higher wages to its workers.
3.6.3.2 Stage 2: Determination of the Optimal Set of Imported Inputs
In this stage, we formulate a recursive algorithm that pins down the optimal set of imported
inputs. Before that, let us consider a firm with its current set of imported inputs, JMi ,
contemplating on whether to import foreign variety for input j. In other words, input j is
moved from the set JZi to J
M
i . After the endogenous adjustment of labor quality, output
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(1   )(1  )(  1)   (  1)Y P   contains only constants and macroeco-
nomic variables that the firm takes as exogeneously given. Under the assumptions on the
parameters, the sign of d⇧i is given by:

















Note that since we do not have fixed costs of importing at each input level, the sign of d⇧i
is independent of the scale of production, thus avoiding the problem of multiple equilibria.








, is always positive, representing the benefits of importing
an extra input j on output quality, and hence, total revenue. These benefits are increasing
in output quality, qi, due to complementarity between quality of newly imported input j and
quality of existing imported inputs in JMi . This implies that there is no crowding out e↵ect -
importing more inputs does not make importing other inputs less desirable. In fact, there is
crowding in - importing more inputs increases the benefits of importing an extra input, thus
increasing the likelihood of importing that input. These benefits are also increasing in firm
productivity, 'i, because more productive firms can make more out of the same imported





, can be either positive or negative, depending on
7Here, we condition on fixed output quality, q
i


















  0. As a result, conditional on already
importing some inputs, that is, the firm has already paid the fixed costs of importing at
the first unit, fM , it is always willing to import such input j because importing is both
quality-enhancing and cost-saving.
Next, we characterize the optimal set of imported inputs. Unlike the framework in Amiti
et al. (2014), which has a cuto↵ implicitly defined because the marginal cost of importing
is fixed and the marginal benefit of importing is monotonically decreasing, our model does
not have a sorting of the inputs nor an implicitly defined cuto↵. Instead, we define the
optimal set recursively and sequentially using an algorithm. We prove the optimality of the
defined set and some of its other desirable properties in the next subsection. For expository

















as the conditional optimal output quality for firm i that imports the set of inputs, S ✓ [0, 1],
and uses domestic varieties for the complementary set, Sc = [0, 1] \S.
An immediate lemma is:




✓ [0, 1], and some firm i with productivity 'i, qi (S1) <
qi (S2). For any two firms i and i0 with productivity 'i < 'i0 and any set S ✓ [0, 1],
qi (S) < qi0 (S). Combining the two results, we also have qi (S1) < qi0 (S1) < qi0 (S2).
The proof is trivial once it is noted that 'biaj > 1.
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Recursive algorithm of computing the optimal set of imported inputs, JM⇤i , con-
ditional on having paid fM
For firm i with productivity 'i, its optimal set of imported inputs, JM⇤i , can be computed
as the following:
Step 1: Define Ji0 =
n






. Based on the argument above, importing
these foreign inputs is both quality-enhancing and cost-saving. Therefore, it is
always beneficial to import them once fM is paid. Hence,
Ji0 ✓ JM⇤i
Step 2: Define Ji1 =
n













there is only crowding in e↵ect of importing more inputs and importing inputs
in Ji1 increases profits, it is optimal for the firm to import them.
Ji1 ✓ JM⇤i
Step 3: Define Ji2 =
n













By the same logic,
Ji2 ✓ JM⇤i






































implying that there is no input, which the firm has not yet imported, that can increase






3.6.3.3 Determination of No-import Cuto↵
Due to the existence of the fixed costs of importing, fM , at the first unit, not every firm
engages in importing. Firms below a productivity threshold, 'nm, do not import any input
while firms above that threshold do. This threshold is determined by comparing the profits
if the firm imports with those if it does not. The marginal firm with productivity 'nm is
indi↵erent between importing and not.
The profits of firm i if it imports are given by:











   (  1)   fM   f (3.40)
where JM⇤i is the optimal set of imported inputs given productivity 'i.
The profits of firm i if it does not import are given by:
⇧i (not importing) = A'
  1
i · (qi (;)Bi (;))
 (  1)   f
= A'  1i · exp
⇢




















> (qi (;)Bi (;)) (  1) = exp
n









because of the optimality of JM⇤i . Even though both ⇧i (importing) and ⇧i (not importing)
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are increasing in 'i, the former increases much faster than the latter, but the former starts
at a lower value due to the existence of fM . Hence, as illustrated by the figure below, the
two profit lines have one intersection, 'nm, after which importing inputs generates higher





Figure 3.7: No-import Cuto↵
3.6.4 Model Implications
In this section, we outline some of the properties implied by the model that guide our
empirical investigations. Some of these properties come naturally out of the model while
others require additional assumptions on the parameters of the model.
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3.6.4.1 No-import Cuto↵
We first examine how the set of firms that engage in importing respond to trade liberaliza-
tion in the form of import tari↵ reductions. Clearly the profit schedule of not importing,
⇧i (not importing), does not change with import tari↵ reductions. The profit schedule of
importing, ⇧i (importing), does, but this change may or may not a↵ect the no-import cut-
o↵, depending on the nature of import tari↵ reductions. We summarize our findings in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose there is trade liberalization in the form of import tari↵ reduc-
tions summarized by {d⌧j  0, j 2 [0, 1]}. The no-import cuto↵ will either decrease,
'nm0 < 'nm, or remain unchanged, 'nm0 = 'nm. The former is true if and only
if the original marginal firm with productivity 'nm has a strictly larger optimal set



































, d⌧j = 0.
An immediate result is that if there is a uniform decrease in import tari↵s, the no-import
cuto↵ decreases. More generally, if there is a decrease in tari↵ on some input in the optimal
set of imported inputs of the original marginal firm, the cuto↵ decreases. This result is con-
sistent with empirical findings that following trade liberalization, previously non-importing
firms in the balanced panel start to import higher quality foreign inputs.
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3.6.4.2 Optimal Set of Imported Inputs
Since the optimal set of imported inputs is at the center of our model, determining equilib-
rium labor quality, output quality and quantity, we investigate the properties of this set.
Proposition 2: All other things being equal, a more productive firm imports a weakly
larger set of foreign inputs. Specifically, if 'i < 'i0 , then JM⇤i ✓ JM⇤i0 .




























m=0 Ji0m for all n 2 {0, 1, . . . , N   1}. Clearly when n = 0, Ji0 =
n



















m=0 Ji0m holds for some n 2 {0, 1, . . . , N   2}. Consider in step n + 1, some
arbitrary input j 2 Jin+1. If j 2
Sn
m=0 Ji0m, then it becomes trivial that j 2
Sn+1
m=0 Ji0m.
So suppose j /2
Sn



































































Hence j 2 Ji0n+1 ✓
Sn+1
m=0 Ji0m. This proves Jin+1 ✓
Sn+1






m=0 Ji0m, so we have
Sn+1









m=0 Ji0m for all n 2 {0, 1, . . . , N   1}.
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Hence by definition j 2 Ji0N2 or j 2
SN2 1
n=0 Ji0n. The former is impossible because Ji0N2 = ;,
so j 2
SN2 1















n=0 Ji0n = J
M⇤
i0 . Repeat this argument for n = N2 +
1, . . . , N
1
  1, we can show that JM⇤i =
SN1 1
n=0 Jin ✓ JM⇤i0 .
Proposition 3: All other things being equal, a reduction in variable trade costs, ⌧j, for
input j increases the likelihood of importing that input for a firm that previously does
not import it. Furthermore, it also increases the likelihood of importing other inputs
that are not imported before by the firm, if input j is now imported.
Proposition 3 is quite intuitive because a reduction in variable trade costs ⌧j decreases the
costs of importing j while keeping benefits unchanged. Hence the firm is more likely to
import j. Conditional on j being imported after the reduction in ⌧j, the set of imported
inputs expands and the output quality increases, further increasing the benefits of importing
other inputs due to the crowding in e↵ect. Hence, the likelihood of the firm importing other
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inputs increases.
Proposition 3 can be generalized to reductions in multiple/all variable trade costs. The
increase in the likelihood is much bigger if the variable trade costs of many inputs that are
previously not imported by the firm decrease at the same time.
3.6.4.3 Labor Quality, Output Quality, and Wages
Recall that for firms above the no-import threshold, 'nm, the optimal labor quality and
output quality are given by:















where JZ⇤i = [0, 1] \JM⇤i is the equilibrium set of domestic inputs.
By proposition 2, we know that a more productive firm imports a weakly larger set of
foreign inputs. Hence, it is obvious from the above expression that this more productive
firm uses strictly higher quality labor and produces strictly higher quality output. Since
equilibrium labor quality is higher for a more productive firm, it also pays higher wages
because pL (c) = c.
Trade liberalization in the form of tari↵ reductions increases the set of imported inputs
for some, if not all, firms, by proposition 3. These firms switch to higher quality foreign
inputs, and hire higher quality labor to complement them. As a result, they produce higher
quality output and pay higher wages.
Suppose the tari↵ reductions induce a decrease in the no-import cuto↵ as in the first case
in proposition 1. Then for those firms with productivities 'i between 'nm0 and 'nm, they
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switch from not importing at all to importing some foreign inputs. Their labor quality and

























This increase is larger, the more productive the firm is, because 'i and JM⇤i are both larger
by proposition 2. As a result, they also pay higher wages after trade liberalization.
For those firms that never import - firms with 'i < 'nm0  'nm, there is no change in
the labor quality, output quality and wages before and after trade liberalization. They are
consistently using the low skill labor, c = 1, producing low quality output, qi = 1, and paying
low wages, pL (1) = 1.
3.6.4.4 Firm Profits
In terms of firm profits, we have a set of similar predictions.
Conditional on the same set of imported inputs, a more productive firm has higher profits
because of its higher 'i and higher qi. By proposition 2, it also imports a weakly larger set
of inputs. It chooses to do so because by importing more, its profits increase. Therefore, we
have shown that a more productive firm enjoys higher profits. Trade liberalization in the
form of input tari↵ reductions generates higher profits for any firms, provided that they are
importing inputs after trade liberalization. This increase in profits comes from two potential
sources. After trade liberalization but conditional on the same set of imported inputs, firm
profits are as least as large as before. It makes strictly larger profits if there is a reduction
in tari↵ on at least one of its imported inputs. Furthermore, the firm chooses to import a
weakly larger set of imported inputs by proposition 3. It chooses to do so only if its profits
increase, evident from the recursive algorithm.
However, who enjoys a bigger increase in profits in the face of the same tari↵ reductions is a
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much tougher question to answer. If we restrict our attention to firms that are new importers
- those with productivity, 'i 2 ['nm0 ,'nm), then it is clear that the more productive firms
have a larger increase in profits than the less productive ones. It is not clear, however, if we
wish to compare profits of an existing importer with those of a new importer. It is possible
that the former increase by more if we impose additional assumptions on {aj}, the natural
advantage of foreign varieties over their domestic counterparts, or if the di↵erential e ciency,
b is large enough.
3.6.4.5 Total Factor Productivity



















































> 1. It is also obvious that a firm with
higher baseline productivity, 'i0 > 'i, ends up with higher TFPi0 > TFPi. Specifically,
from proposition 2, we know that JM⇤i0 ◆ JM⇤i . Let H = JM⇤i0 \JM⇤i = JM⇤i0 \
 
JM⇤i
 c ◆ ; be


































































The first inequality holds with equality when H = ; and holds strictly otherwise. The
second inequality holds strictly because we assume that 'i0 > 'i   'nm, which results in a
non-empty set JM⇤i .













Since it does not import any foreign inputs, there is no productivity enhancing e↵ect from
imported inputs. Hence, its TFP is the same as its baseline productivity parameter, 'i. It






Trade liberalization increases firm-level TFP through the expansion of the set of imported
inputs. Again suppose this trade liberalization induces a reduction in no-import cuto↵ from
'nm to 'nm0 , as in the first case in proposition 1. First, consider a firm with productivity
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'i   'nm. Before trade liberalization, its optimal set of imported inputs is JM⇤i . It expands
to JM⇤
0
i with H being the di↵erence between the two sets. Then the expansion in the optimal















Equality holds only when H = ;.

















because its set of imported inputs expands from null set to JM⇤0i   ;. And further, JM⇤0i is
weakly increasing in 'i for such a firm by proposition 2. So for a newly importing firm, the
increase in TFP is increasing in its baseline productivity.
Trivially, for a firm that never imports, there are no TFP gains from trade liberalization.
However, it is not straightforward to compare the increase in TFP of two arbitrary firms,
either both are existing importers, 'i,'i0   'nm, or one is a new importer while the other
is an existing importer, 'nm0  'i < 'nm,'i0   'nm). That depends on the expansion of
the set of imported inputs induced by trade liberalization, and on the parameter b, which
governs the degree of di↵erential e ciency among firms in using foreign inputs. In general, a
more productive firm has smaller room to expand its set of imported inputs. However, this
constraint can be alleviated by a large b - that is, it is also much more e cient in using the




Since a firm’s decision to import foreign inputs is endogenous, we adopt the fixed e↵ects
2SLS model to estimate the e↵ects of the di↵erential change in import intensity of firms on
their productivity and average wage. More specifically, we use the input tari↵ reductions
following China’s accession to the WTO as an instrument for firm import behavior, following
Goldberg et al. (2010). Another concern is that the trade reform itself is endogenous in the
sense that less e cient industries lobby for higher trade protection. Branstetter and Lardy
(2006) discuss the motive for China’s leadership to agree to the conditions required for
its WTO accession. They conclude that, “In short, China’s top political leadership made
extensive commitments to the WTO in order to advance their domestic reform agenda.”
China joined the WTO to speed up the domestic reforms and facilitate the transition into
a market economy. The input tari↵ reductions are unlikely due to the protection pressure
from interest groups in less e cient industries.
To examine the e↵ects of tari↵ reductions on firm import behavior, we have to consider the
set of intermediate inputs that a firm may actually import. We construct an industry-level
input tari↵ at the 4-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) level to avoid endogeneity
bias following Amiti and Konings (2007), Goldberg et al. (2010) and Ge et al. (2011). We
construct an output tari↵ by taking a simple average of the HS 8-digit codes within each
4-digit CIC code. The di culty is that our sample period covers a revision of CIC system
in 2003 and a major reclassification of the international HS 6-digit codes in 2002. First,
we follow Brandt et al. (2012) to create a concordance of standardized 4-digit CIC codes
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consistent before and after 2003. Then we construct a link of 6-digit HS codes before and
after 2002. We further construct a crosswalk between standardized 6-digit HS codes and
standardized CIC codes based on Brandt et al. (2012). With these links in place, we assign
each 8-digit HS product to the 6-digit HS code it belongs to, and then connect this 6-digit HS
code with the corresponding 4-digit CIC code, for each year. Next, for each 4-digit industry,
we compute an input tari↵ as a weighted average of the output tari↵, where the weights
are the cost shares of one industry in the production of a good in another based on the
Input-Output Table. We drop output tari↵ of the industry that a firm belongs to from this
calculation to remove the direct e↵ects of output tari↵s on wages. Finally, we interact the
industry-level input tari↵ with a firm’s baseline productivity to study their heterogeneous
responses. We use the firm-level TFP measured in 1998 to proxy for it, which is independent
of a firm’s future import choices.
The first-stage regression that we run is the following:
Importft = ↵0 + ↵1InputTariffit ⇤ Productivityf,1998 + ↵2InputTariffit
+Zf,t 1 +Df +Dt + vft (3.45)
where Importft is measured by the total number of newly imported varieties (or products).
Z includes firm age, last year’s log revenue and last year’s export status. Dt is a set of year
dummies that control for possible variation in the macroeconomic environment over time; Df
is included to control for unobservable individual e↵ects of the firm that could be correlated
with its import behavior. We use robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level.


















Y ear FE yes
*p < 0.1;**p < 0.05;***p < 0.01;
Table 3.13: First Stage
level. We find that the total number of varieties that are newly imported goes up as a result
of tari↵ reductions. The coe cient of InputTariffit ⇤ Productivityf,1998 is also statistically
significant and negative, which suggests that a firm with higher baseline productivity in-
creases its imported inputs by more in response to tari↵ reductions. The total number of
newly imported varieties is also higher for a firm that is bigger, younger and exports. We
also look at the corresponding regression at the product level and the results are very similar.
3.7.2 Second Stage
Next, we look in the data to see how the expansion of the external margin of imported inputs
a↵ects firm-level TFP and average wage.
The second-stage regression that we run is the following:
Yft = ↵0 + ↵1 \importft ⇤ Productivityf,1998 + ↵2 \importft
+Zf,t 1 +Df +Dt + vft (3.46)
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where Yft is firm-level TFP and its log average wage. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
Table 3.14 reports the regression results of TFP measured by Levinsohn-Petrin method
and firm log average wage. We use TFP measured by Olley-Pakes method as a robustness
check and the two regressions lead to very similar results. Note that imported inputs increase
firm productivity and average wage a firm pays to its workers. Since a firm with higher
baseline productivity increases its imported inputs by more, its productivity goes up by
more as well as its average wage. As discussed in the section of model implications, each
unit of newly imported inputs also increases measured TFP and average wage of a more
productive firm by more, and this prediction is supported by the statistically significant and
positive coe cient of \importft ⇤Prodf,1998 in each of the regressions. Firm productivity and

















Y ear FE yes yes
*p < 0.1;**p < 0.05;***p < 0.01;
Table 3.14: Second Stage
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3.8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we develop a partial equilibrium, heterogeneous firm model with endogenous
imported inputs and labor quality choice and establish a link between an improvement in
firm performance and the use of imported inputs. The model further predicts that firms
that upgrade their intermediate inputs also upgrade their labor quality, resulting in higher
wages. Combining Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and Chinese Customs Data,
we are able to test our model’s predictions in the data, and we find considerable support.
There are some issues that we have not yet addressed and are left as future work. First,
we wish to empirically test the output quality upgrading hypothesis proposed in Broda and
Weinstein (2006). Second, we want to extend our model to accommodate variable markups
and then empirically test the model’s prediction about firm markup distribution. Third, we
would also like to look into firm ownership structure more carefully so that we can say more
about the mechanism that generates the link between firms profits and wage inequality that
is observed in the data.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Welfare Change as Equivalent Variation



























The equivalent variation buz is the proportional change in income at the original prices to








They imply, with the help of Roy’s identity,










































































































































A.3 Specialization in Production





, where ↵j denotes the skill intensity of a sector. As expected,
skill-abundant countries produce relatively more in skill-intensive sectors in equilibrium.
In addition, we construct an index of a country n0s relative price increase in skill-intensive











↵j. As expected, we find that skill-abundant
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Figure A.1: Specialization in Production and Price Changes
A.4 Total Supply
Output produced by a worker of labor type   who works in sector j in country h is:
Ah( )T ( , j)E(✏z|z 2 Zh( ), wz(j)   wz(j0)) 8j0 2 J
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Total supply of good (j, h) is :
X
 














A.5 Gauss-Jacobi Algorithm and Property of the Equi-
librium
The Gauss-Jacobi algorithm procedure reduces the problem of solving for n unknowns simul-
taneously in n equations to that of repeatly solving n equations with one unknown. More
specifically, given the known value of the kth iterate, xk, one uses the ith equation to com-
pute the ith component of unknown xk+1, the next iterate. Formally xk+1 is defined in terms




















, ..., xkn 1, x
k+1
n ) = 0 (A.7)
The linear Gauss-Jacobi method takes a single Newton step to approximate the components







, i = 1, ..., n.
Note that the set of prices enter both the demand side and the supply side nonlinearly. In
general, for a system of nonlinear equations, it’s not possible to characterize the conditions
under which a solution exists or is unique. We appeal to the Implicit Function Theorem
to show that the price equilibrium that we’ve found numerically using the Gauss-Jacobi
method is locally isolated as a function of the parameters. It states that if F is continuously
di↵erentiable, if F (x⇤) = 0 and if DF (x⇤) has full rank, then the zero set of F is, near x⇤, an
N -dimensional surface in RL. Our excess demand functions are continuously di↵erentiable
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and the vector of prices set them to 0. Also, the Jacobian matrix of these functions has full
rank (J ⇤N = 1400).
Total Derivative Applying the Gauss-Jacobi method to numerically calcuate the set of
equilibrium prices requires computing the total derive of the market clearing conditions with
respect to the prices. This section provides more detail.
Supply Recall that the total supply of good (j, h) is:
X
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n are total di↵erentiation of Sn
(j,h) and w̄
n with respect to prices.
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(j,h) , we obtain:
dSn

























































































































































































! dyn = dlnw̃n   dlnan = ˆ̃wn   ân






























































































The term inside the bracket is Sn
(j,h)    (j,h)yn. Therefore,














The change in the inequality-adjusted average income can be expressed in terms of changes
in log-prices:










































⇡n ( , j) p̂n
(j,n)
#




⇡n ( , j) p̂n
(j,n)
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is the digamma function.
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Finally, Sn
(j,h) is a function of {lnpn(j,h)}h2N , that is, {lnph(j,h)}h2N and {ln⌧n(j,h)}h2N . yn =
lnw̄n + ⌃n   lna(pn) is a function of {ph
(j,h)}j2J , {lnph(j,h)}h2N and {ln⌧n(j,h)}h2N .
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Countries in IPUMS-I
Brazil (2000), Canada (2001), Colombia (1973), India (2004), Jamaica (2001), Mexico (2000),
Panama (2000), United States (2005), Uruguay (2006), Venezuela (2001), Israel (1995),
Germany (1970), Puerto Rico (2005), Indonesia (1995), South Africa (2007), Dominican
Republic (2002).













































Take a first-order approximation at p = 1, T = 1:












































log T ( , j)
#)












































labor group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
sex Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male
age 15-24 15-24 15-24 25-49 25-49 25-49 50-74 50-74 50-74
edu ED0-2 ED3-4 ED5-8 ED0-2 ED3-4 ED5-8 ED0-2 ED3-4 ED5-8
labor group 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
sex Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female
age 15-24 15-24 15-24 25-49 25-49 25-49 50-74 50-74 50-74
edu ED0-2 ED3-4 ED5-8 ED0-2 ED3-4 ED5-8 ED0-2 ED3-4 ED5-8
Table B.1: Labor Groups
B.4 Non-homothetic Gravity Equation

















































































































































































B.5 Di↵erences in Tastes across Countries
Under the additional assumptions on   and
P
n ↵n = 1 combined with the equation ↵
h
(j,n) =






h = ↵j +  ̄jy




































































































j   SWj )  ↵n ̄j⌦h (B.9)
B.6 Counterfactual - Back to Autarky
Recall that the global welfare change of individual z under the AIDS between an initial

















tr and  ln(bhcf/bhtr) are functions of the prices in the two scenarios. I need to
compute the prices of domestic commodities in autarky {ph,cf
(j,h)} as well as the consumer-
specific reservation prices of foreign varieties {ph,cf
(j,n),z} that are no longer consumed.
The restriction to non-negative individual expenditure shares may bind in the counter-
factual. In these cases, I find consumer-specific reservation prices such that the individual
shares of dropped varieties are all zero and the remaining individual shares are adjusted





for all j and sh,cf
(j,n),z = 0 for all j and n 6= h.
Reservation prices ph,cf





































































Replacing this back into the second equation gives the reservation prices of the foreign






































is the homothetic component of the price index, and wcfz
is the autarky income of percentile z from the home country, and it’s a function of {ph,cf
(j,h)}.




I combine these reservation prices equations with J market clearing conditions in autarky
which set the total supply to equal to the total demand.
The total supply of good (j, h) is:
X
 






which is a function of {ph,cf
(j,h)} in autarky.
Under the parametric restrictions, the expenditure share for consumer z in goods from






























(j,n) and  ̄j =
P
n  (j,n).











(j,n),z = 0 , n 6= h (B.17)








Since w̄cfh is a function of {p
h,cf







is a function of {ph,cf
(j,h), p
h,cf





for each h. Combined with the equations of reservation prices above, I have J+(N 1)⇤J ⇤Z
equations in J + (N   1) ⇤ J ⇤ Z unknowns.
Once I have solved for the output prices {ph,cf
(j,h)}j2J in autarky, I can back out wh( ) and











The autarky wage distribution is:
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